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International organization is the process whereby states 
establish and develop formal, continuing structures for the 
conduct of certain aspects of their relationships.1 It is 
representative of an effort by statesmen to reduce the extreme 
decentralization of the traditional nation-state system, and 
to establish the mechanics necessary to adapt to the constantly 
increasing requirements posed by the complexity of .the inter­
dependence of states. In this paper, we shall seek to explore 
one of the manifestations of this developmental process---the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts by international organ­
izations who expressly engage in conflict management operations.,r; 
Here, we shall consider the peacekeeping process in light 
of its degree of success relative to the comparative power 
capabilities and potentialities of adversary nation-states. 
This 1s a hypothesis testing effort. It 1s not an attempt to 
examine the legal aspects of international organization, nor 
a quest for effective ·structural reforms. It is, however, a 
study cognizant of the importance of these aspects of the inter­
.. _ play of states· within the present international system. The 
.results shall be evaluative to be certain, but just as surely 
this is not an exercise in reform. 
1 
Inis L. Claude, Jr., International Encyclopedia£!. the 
Social Sciences, vol. 8, p.33. 
(2) 
1.2 The Hypothesis 
In that which follows, this author shall attempt to analyze 
exis ting international organizations as to one aspect of their 
effectiveness in abating and controlling confl ict situations. 
Our hypothesis shall be this: In two-party disput es, the success 
of international organization peacekeeping efforts increases 
as the difference in their national power decreases. 
To test the above proposition will require a great deal 
of operationalization of terms and methods. Due consideration' 
will be given to that task in the methodology section below, 
and as the sit uat ion warrants. 
1.3 Methodology 
Essential to this sil.dy is the work of Haas, Butterworth 
and Nye in Conflict Management £l International Organizations. 
Without it,  this study would be infinitely more difficult. 
In their book, the authors s eek to determine the effect­
iveness of intergovernmental organization. They hope to answer 
a series of questions through systematic examinat ion of the 
success of the United Nations, the Organization of American 
States, the Organization for African Unity, the Arab League 
and the Council of Europe. 
They establish a universe of 146 dis putes, considered be­
cause they meet certain criteria relevant to the study, entered 
into by one of the above mentioned organizations for the purpose 
of con trolling the situation. They scored the organization's 
success as to effectiveness in 1) abating the conflict, 2 )  stop-· 
j>ing the hostilities, J) isolating the conflict and 4) settling 
( 3 ) 
!! conflict. Summed scores on the four variables gave them 
a raw success score for each dispute. The raw success scores 
were reduced to a "dimensionality scale"(DS) rating of one to 
four. DS1 means the organization completely failed to make a 
difference to the outcome of the dispute. DS2 indicates the 
organization made some difference on each of two dimensions(one 
of which must be.abating). DSJ indicates moderate success and 
effectiveness on.a minimum of three dimensions. And, Ds4 means 
the organization made a great deal of difference on one di-
mension and at least some difference on the three others. 
In attempting to draw a conclusion upon our hypothesis, this 
study is of grent importance. We can take each of the four groups 
' I 
derived by Haas et al., and extract the two-party disputes 
within each group. 
To determine relative national power, this author has chosen 
to use six indices of power, 1) armed forces personnel, 2 )  do­
mestic food production, 3) population, 4) gross domestic pro­
duct, 5) trade value and 6) area. For each state involved in 
a dispute, these variables will be determined. 
Then, we can deter�ine the difference in each variable. For 
each. group we can sum the differences and determine the mean 
for each DS group. 
The next step is to compare the means of each Ds group. To 
begin, a t-test of significance will be done to determine if 
there is a significant difference between.the means of the grouped 
data. If a significant difference does exist, we can move on 
to further examination. We can then graphically examine relation-
ships betwe�n the variables and increased organization success 
(4) 
as measured by Haas. We can look for patterns and regularities 
in this relationship., If no significant differ ence exists, as 
determined by the t-te st, we can move immediately to a con­
clusion on-our hypothesis . 
1'.4 Justification for this Ope rat ion 
For each beginning t here are reasons, and this study had 
very clear beginnings. Its early motivations stem from state­
ments made by two different men, each a widely read international 
relations expert. 
In The Intermediaries: Third Parties in Inte rnational Crisis, - - --- --- --- -----
Oran R. Young made thi.s statement ,. 
"It is clear that the probabil ity of succe�s 
for an interve ning part y in any given crisis 
will be related to the existence of at least 
a rough parity of power between the principal 
parties to the dispute. In cases where the 
margin of power favoring eit her of the 
protagonists is small, even an intrinsical ly 
weak third party may be able to· intervene with 
some real effect. "2 
This in itself'was enouP--h to give form t o  our' hypothesis. It 
i ' · 
clearly impl ies an_ inverse relationship between the power parity 
of contending nation�states and the potential success of an 
intervening party. 
However, further investigation turned up anot her statement 
, 
conveying a similar idea. George Liska has stated that, "The 
smaller, the margin that favors either of two contending parties, 
the more relevant is the total power of e ven an intrinsically 
2 
· Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in Inter-. 
national Crlsis, p. 4J. 
UJ 
weak third party. 
(§) 
Both of these statements point in the same direction. 
Either of' the.two could lead to our hypothesis. The quote by 
Young is of even greater interest because it was made without 
supporting evidence� This author finds that hard to take from 
a book published in 196?. A test of his unsupported contention·· 
seems. justified. 
Why is this study in order? What can it accomplish? What 
positive good may come of it? It would seem to be easiest to 
approach these questions-by listing the reasons and hopes for 
this study. 
1) This first reason is also the foremost. It is longiand 
involved. It must, however, be fully explained. 
·The twentieth cen.tury has witnessed· the tremendous growth 
of political science as a discipline. It has undergone a gradual 
.process of development, culminating in acceptance as a sepe.rate 
field of study. The dawn of political consciousness dates at 
least to the code of Hammurabi and the Talmudic legends. �rly 
writers advanced numerous theories of the rise of political 
consciousness. The overriding effect of such speculation ls 
that man has come to reali ze that there exists both a political 
and a non-political aspect of his life. 
The evolution of political science as a discipline has pre­
cipitated a number of conceptual and developmental orientations. 
Throughout its evolution, political science has undergone a 
J. . 
George Liska, "The Third Party: The Rationale of Non-
Alignment," in Neutralism and Non-Alignment, p.80. 
(�) 
number of significant changes. One such change has been the 
development and adoption of differing paradigms of met hod­
ological analysis. At various times, political scient ists have 
embraced historicism, game t heory , field t heory, input-output 
analysis, symmetry models and ends-means chains as legitimate 
$nalytic models. But, it is with a discussion of one of the newer 
conceptual schemes---behavioralism---that this list begins. The 
purpose of such will soon become_ evident. 
The movement called "behavioralism" began in t he 1920's 
, -
and 1930's under the stimulus of the Chicago school of Merriam, 
Lasswell and Gosnell. 
4' 
new direct ion, 
They stiught t o  s�t t he discipline in a 
Scolars such as t hese rightly observed th�t 
nineteenth cent ury academic political science �as wedded to the 
realist theory of knowledge.
5 
Later, the principles of realism 
were rivaled by t hose of the idealists. Idealism gradually 
began to gain accept ance as the basis of modern science, as 
evidenced. by the acceptance of the works of 
Alfred N9rth Whitehead,7 and later, Anatol 
6 
Percy w. Bridgeman, 
8 
Rapoport._ Wi�h 
this, the behavioralists· began to construct and apply models 
4 ' 
David Easton, International Encyclopedia £!, the Social 
. Sciences, •ol� 12, p. 291. 
5 -
Michael Haas and Henry s. Kariel, eds., Approaches to � 
· Study of Polit ical Science, p.5. 
(7) 
both analytically in building theory and empirically in guiding 
research. 
The behavioralist movement underwent massive rethinking 
with the end of World War Two. Many political scientists were 
serving as governmental officials during that period. They 
were astonished to discover that their advice went unheeded, 
while that of psychologists, economists and sociologists· was 
quite readily implemented. The_ reason, they soon discovered, 
centered upon the observatl.on that their research was conducted 
by persons of similar scientific orientations. Political 
scientists, in contrast, were not regarded as having scientific 
I 9 
competence. 
In response to this, and the popular notion that political 
science was closely linked to matters of public policy, post­
World War.Two political scientists presented the behavioral 
program: for change. They urged one another to build theories, 
to assemble data,· test hypotheses and to disregard. values. The 
1950's saw the hey4ay of formalistic behavioralism, and the 1960's 
were the apogee of empirical behavioralism. As a mo ..vement, ·be-
havioralism moved scientific political science to the fore. 
. Behavioralism, however, ·did not evolve without ·challenge and . . 11 12 
criticism • .  Alfred Cobban, 1° Christian Bay, _and Hedley Bull 
9 . 
Haas and Kariel , p.13. 
10 . . . 
Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory, " Political 
11 
.. , Science Quarterly, September 1953; p. 321-337. 
Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical 
Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature, " American 
Political Science Review, September 1957, p. 734-746 • 
. 2 ' 
Hedley Bull, ""tnternational Relations: The Case for a Classical 
Appra·ach: World Poli tics, April 1966, p. 361-377. 
(8) 
stand out amo�ng the most vociferous critics. They, and others, 
criticized the overemphasis upon facts.. David Easton has termed 
the behavioralist era a period of "hyperfactualism."
13 Others 
pleaded for a greater use of theory, for they viewed theory as a 
counterforce to the brutal empiricism of the early behavioralists. 
To them, theory would lend substance and direction to the 
methodological rigor imposed by the behavioralists. 
Some feel that behavioralism has run its course. Such is 
the opinion of Robert A. Dahl, a·s evidenced by his "epitaph" to 
14 
the behavioral paradigm. He, and others, feel that behav1oral1sm 
�as functioned well as one of a number of schemes of politi�al 
inquiry, but that there is a need to move ahead. and create a new 
mode of investigation. In his 1969 address to the American 
Political Science Association, David Easton called for a new 
revolution--�one seeking to refine certain behavioral techniques, 
while disregarding others. Easton calls for a forward looking 
perspective dedicated to the advancement of the premises and 
purposes of political research.
15 
With the passing of one movement, and the calling forth of 
another, one must pause and reflect upon the present state of the 
methodology of _political science. What has behavioralism left 
lJ. 
David Easton, The Political System, p.12. · 
14 
15 
Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach to Political Science: 
Epitaph to a Monument to a Successful Protest, " American 
Political Science Review, December 1961, pp. 763-772. 
David Easton, ·�The New Revolution in Poli ti cal Science, " 
in Approachf's to the Study of Political Science, p. 512. 
(9) 
us? Perhaps its primary purpose was to awaken our collective 
·scientific consciousness, and turn our thoughts to the tenets of 
scientific inquiry . A .Primary fault was that it was almost 
entirely a technical movement seek ing to d i sgard the remnants 
of classicism. Theory was dropped along the way, resulting in the 
loss of a possible theoretical matrix in which to define the 
boundaries of polit i cal science, and in which to carry on re-
levant, timely scientific research . Whatever the present atate, 
only time can truly tell. However, it is apparent that, at the 
least, the legacy of behavioralism is a recognition of the useful­
ness of scientific methods---tempered by a synthesis with theoretical 
co�cerns about the fundamental is�ues of political systems. 
The above statement by Young seems to betray this legacy, 
and represents a breach in the development of a forward-looking 
discipline. Young seems to completely ignore scientifically 
structured inquiry. Statements entirely lacking of sc ientific 
justification are to be disdained . Political science has been 
moving forward in its goals and hopes. It is an aim of this 
study to denounce the publication of unsubstantiated general-
1zat ions. If our hypothesis proves the Young statement incorrect, 
the danger of making such unverified statements become&obviou s. 
2) As was demonstrated in the methods section, the study by 
Haas is a cornerstone of this paper . It is a hope of this study 
to take Haas ' findings and further profit from them by following 
up on hypotheses it generates. Young ' s  book did a theoretical 
study of third party intervention· in internation crisis. The 
Baas study takes us further. Here, we mutually enhance the 
theoretical and the empirical. 
(10) 
J) Any timely empirical· operation of potential value is self-
justified. It lendf: substance to accumulated theory end SJ?eC­
ulation, while lowering the level of our abstractions. 
4) It is very possible that this study will turn out to be 
'"' 
of little worthvitself; however, it could prove a move in the 
right direction. It may move a potentially solvable hypothesis 
(which this may turn out to be) closer to solution. 
5) This is an investigation into one aspect of international 
behavior. International events; notably war, are closely tied 
to everyday events for a major war may cause mass conscription, 
mass suffering, mass economic deprivation and mass grief. 
6)1 Though decidedly narrow, our hypothesis may prove of worth 
to our understanding of international peacekeeping operations 
and of our understanding of war as the ultimate instrument of 
statecraft. 
7) It may serve to point out a regularity in.the workings and 
success of international organizations. 
8) If this study indicates some significant relationship 
between two variables, then we can move on to the more critical 
question---What is the causal relationship of the variables? 
Is it caused by a third variable� Or, is it due to a more com­
plicated inter-relationship of the two variables? 
9) This study can be viewed as a response to a need for the 
explanation of complex social problems, though it is so"'l"6� 
.insignificant in itself. 
10) Lastly, this study may prove serendipitous. The term 
serendipity derives from Walpole's book "Three Princes of 
Serend1p," in which three princes set out on a futile search 
(11) 
for something, but accidently discovered many valuable things not 
so.ught. Doing this could lead accidently to some things of 
even greater value. One could blindly stumble from the in-
significant to the significant. 
1.5 Review of � Pertinent LitPrature 
A section reviewing the germane literature should include a 
look at all previous works relevant to the experiment. The 
study of it is important for thr.ee particular reasons. 
First, it may help to formulate the problem and make it more 
concrete. A review can lead to a more valuable notion of what 
the problem represents. Secondly, a survey of the pertinent know-
1 
ledge indicates whether or not the experiment needs to be done. 
There is certainly no point in fully repeating past experiments-­
iunless the purpose is to update, confirm or disprove a previous 
i i 
ifinding. Thirdly, past works may give helpful hints as to the 
I 
!proper conduct of the inquiry. 
I 
The literature relevant· to this study is concerned with 
i 
ltwo areas---internat1ona1 organization peacekeeping efforts, and 
I 
lthe assessment of national power. It is difficult to discriminate 
[between the substantive and the methodological literature. They 
i 1ar� closely li-nked and, therefore, not entirely considered apart 
lfroim one another. There are no clear lines of demarcation, though 
]ar1 ,attempt is made to consider and study them separately. 
I The htstory and development o! international organization 
has attracted the attention of a number of scholars. Of little 
direct relevance for this paper, it, however, seems proper to 
review it oecause it will allow us R better understanding of the 
con.ceptual basis of international organization. Even a brief 
(12) 
look at any one of a number of works makes obvious the fact that 
international organizations are characterized by efforts to 
arrange cooperation among states. They seek to minimize the elAment 
of conflict and maximize the potent.isl for harmony and cooperation 
in the relations among states. 
Given only this, one might view international organization 
as overly idealistic. However, a closer look at the structure 
of international organizations will reveal that·they are well 
aware of the dualistic nature of international relations. There 
1s an acknowledgement of both the cooperative ideals and the con­
flictual realities. The former is characterized by the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, the latter by its 
Security Council.16 
There are a number of fine books dealing with the history 
and development of .international organization. Of particular use 
was Inis L. 'Claude's Swords .!E12, Plowshares. For a less incisive 
study, one. could consult Gerad J .  Mangone' s A Short History £!'_ 
International Organization. 
Some other books in.this area sought not only. to review the 
' .. 
history and development of international organizations, but also 
' '  
to evaluate the record of such organizations. Robert E. Asher, 
1n � � � � Promotion £!'_ � General Welfare, attempts 
a summary review of the record of the economic an�
, 
social organs· 
of various internation�l organizations. Similarly, Goodrich and 
Simons as�ess the role of a number of specialized agencies in 
16 
' !··.' 
Claude,.International Ency'clopedia .2£ � Social Sciences, . p. 31. 
(lJ) 
!!:!!::. U.N. !!!2, the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
For a different approach to the subject, one might consult 
Ernst B. Haas in Beyond the Nation-State. Therein, he formulates 
an eclectic approach to international· integration based upon a 
form of functionalism attributable to early works of function­
alists such a� David Mitrany. 
The literature devoted to quantitatively assessing.the role 
of international peacekeeping efforts seems nearly non-existant. 
The Haas study, which forms a foundation of this study, Conflict 
Management � International Organizations, is one of the scant 
few. One other fine quantitative study.was conducted by J.K. 
Gordan. He undertook a study of the operation of the United 
17 
Nations in the Middle East and the Congo. He hoped to discover 
the preconditions of success or failure� He concludes that no 
peacekeeping operations will succeed without sustained great-
power support, and the agreement must take into account the 
security needs and human needs of those most directly involved in 
crises. 
Political science can be viewed as a discipli.ne still in 
search for its bound�ies and exclustve concerns. One outgrowth 
of. this search has been the conceptualization of political 
science as a set of interrelated functional-behavioral processes, 
one of which is the competition for national power. 
�reat deal of effort has gone into espousing the view that 
the state is a set of social groups in competition for power over 
17 . J . K .  Gordan, "Prospects for Peacekeeping, " International 
Journal, Spring 1970, pp. 370-387. 
(14) 
others. In the 19.30's, George E.C. Catlin published A Study 2f. 
� Principles of_Politics. In 19.34, Charles E. Merriam published 
Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence, wherein he, as did 
C�tl1n, argued for an interpretation of politics as a set of 
power relationships. These works were soon foll?wed by Harold 
Lasswell's Politics: Who �- �' When and How?, and v.o. Key, 
Jr.•s Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. 
These seminal works did much to stimulate research at all 
levels of human interaction---from the nation--state level to 
the comm.uni ty-.;-organizational level. · As a means of approaching 
the analysis of political phenomena, power found further support 
in power !!!2- Society: !_Framework !.2!. Political Analysis, jointly 
' 
authored by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan. Bertrand de 
Jouvenal contributed to the movement with his Power: Ih!, Natural 
H1storr . .2!. Its Growth. 
There also exists a set of literature questioning the validity 
of power as an approach to the study of human interaction. Two 
outstanding works come immediately to mind • .  · First, is J .G. 
March's � Power of Power and secondly, William Biker's article 
entitled."Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power." Riker points 
out the �mbigui ties inherent in the useful'l.ness of power as an 
approach to analysis and research. He says that power is at one 
and the same time too narrow and too broad. It fails to recognize 
that power involves more �han control and that power relations 
do not exist exclusively in that area of life considered political. 
March takes it one large step further and ·suggests the total 
abandonment of power as a useful approach to study and research. 
(15) 
The usefulness of power as an approach, however, seems to 
have outlasted its critics. A look at any number of recent text­
books reveal that power as an approach is not lost . Rather, it 
remains a theme central to the study of political interaction. 
This is certainly so at the international level. Donald Puchala's 
International Politics Today is not atypical. In his book, designed 
as a text for introductory international relat ions courses, he 
deals with power as an approach, ,and with power reference. 
Traditional political science nas emphasized the role of 
power. Indee4,; "balance of power" and "spheres of influenct' are 
basic terms. Catlin has sta�ted in Systematic Politics that "all 
politics is by nature power politics."18. Also, a n�mber of 
theories on the causes of war, such a s  A.F.K. Organsk i's, speak 
19 
of war as changes in national power, but few of the se specify 
in quantitative t erms what is meant by national power• It is 
unfortunate that the outstanding feature of this body of literature 
is its brevity. 
In the 1950's, . researchers began to question the notion t hat 
power was solely dependent::upon military strength. They wondered 
if national power might also depend upon pc:!fUlat ion, degree of 
industrialization and type of government. Organski was the first 
20 




George E. C. Catlin, . Systematic Politics, p.79. 
A.F .K. Organski, World Poli tics, · ·p� 332. 
Katherine Organski and A.F.K. Organsk i, Populat ion and 
World Power, p.29. 
(16) 
Early attempts to move from the intuitive to the empirical 
7ielded a most rudimentary index of power. Organllti states that 
the ·ubest index of national power currently known" is national 
21 22 income. Kingsley Davis drew the same conclusion. After 
some reconsideration, Organski called for the use of gross 
national product as a single indication of power. These indices 
have the merit of simplicity, but fall short of being comprehensive. 
Only recently have significant advances been made. At present, 
two techniques ,,·are being explored for possible utility in 
assessing national �ower. 
In The Anatomy � Influence, Robert w. Cox and Harold K. 
Jacobson use five indicators of power, l)" gross national product, 
2) gross national product/capita� 3) population14) nuclear 
·; ., ... 
capability and 5) prestige. Each indicator is reduced to a scale. 
'l'he::scoreton'.each ·is summed, yielding a "power rating" score. 
Then,.for each year considered, all countries were rank ordered. 
This gave the authors a stratification of power scale. In his 
article, "Tentative Evaluation of World Power," F .  Clifford 
German employs a similar scaling technique. He gives special 
weighting to nuclear capability and includes a morale variable, 
while ignoring prestige. His much more complex computation 
yields a rank ordering of states. 
Others are investigating toe possible utility of psycho­
physical measurement techniques to the study of nat ional power. 
·Psychophysical scaling techniques are·based upon the perception 
of certain variables. 
Alcock and Newcombe, in "The Perception of National Power,• 
21 , 
�-· p.436. 
�2Kingsley Davis, Freedom and Society, pp. 206-243. 
(17) 
have moved us closer to a quantitative definition of national power. 
In doing so, they asked 38 Canadian subject s to rank 123 states . 
J 23 
"in order of power as they thinkvthem.• · The authors analyzed 
the results by averaging the rank orders and using regression 
analysis techniques. The result was an equation, u sable in 
quantifying national power. 
I Allen M. Shinn, Jr. , has developed a technique similar to 
the above. · He, too, uses p sychophysical scaling and perceptions. 
His equations employ.� three variables(GNP/oapita, militari�ation, 
and population), each treated a s  a multiple of a coefficient and 
24 summed. 
These two efforts represent a significant advance, for they 
make a methodological statement. It is regrettable that these 
techniques cannot be used here. This author i s  willing to put 
trust in perceptions, essential to ,the use of psychophysical 
techniques. However, this study covers a period of time be­
ginning with 1946.· It i s  impossible, at this time, to assess 
perception as far back as that year. The Cox technique is 
simply unacceptable because point values for each variable are 
based upon artificially constructed scales. It is based upon 
intuitive divi sions, not scientiflcally significant divisions. 
23 . 
. Norman z. Alcock and Allen G. Newcombe, "The Perception 
• .·. of National Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 336. 
24 . . , 
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Allen M. Shinn, ·•An Application of Psychophysica1·scaling 
Technique�o the Measur�ment. or National Power, • Journal 
.2!• foll tics., November 1969, •;pp. 932-951. 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1 The Nature of Power 
W�en one approaches the study of one aspect of international 
politics through the analysis of national power, one assumes, at 
a minimum, that the relations of power are among the relevant 
aspects of a political system. National power is a many sided 
national characteristic. It can play many roles. It can denote 
and connot�any things. Power relations may be viewed as one 
feature among a number of other salient features. On the other 
, 
hand, an analyst may view power as the one most important 
distinguishing feature of that part of humal! activity called 
politics. Those.:: of the first viewpoint would consider power 
sufficiently important so as to warrant description and emphasis. 
'!'hose of the former m·ay .,hold that "political sciencei:-�, as �n 
) • 
empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing 
25 
of powel.'•" In short, it is a complex national quality 
important to an understanding of international poli�iQs. 
What.follows is a discussion of the varied aspects of 
national power as a national characteristic. Operationalizati on 
and discussion of national power is essential. This authors 
use of power signifies his assumed belief that differences in the 
distribution of power is a useful tool for interpreting changes 
and events between societies. 
25 
Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, 
p. xiv. 
( 19 )  
What, then, is power ?  Power has been the sub j ect of human 
study since time immemorial. From Aristotle to Hobbe s, Machiave l li ,  
Rousseau, Montesquieu and others, power has be en of central 
concern . 26 Knorr says power is "the a bil i ty to affect behavior. " 
A . F . K .  Organski believes it to be "the ability to determine the 
27 
behavior of others. " Herbert Goldhammer and Edwin A .  Shils 
go a step further and state that "power is the ability to influence 
28 
the behavior of others in accordance with one ' s  own ends. "  
It is obvious that not all agree on the exact definition of 
power . However, the common ground is q u i t e  substantial . For 
our purposes it i s  necessary to keep in mind that, 1 )  power is 
a relatio nship between ind i vid ual s or gr�ups and, . 2 )  that power 
i s the capacity- of one to modify the behavior of others to some 
desired end .  
How i s  power exercised'? The answer is not a �imple one, 
but , for our purposes let us consider four means .  First, Nation 
A can P..ersuade Natio� B to do what A wa nt s it to do. For Natior:i 
A , this i� by far the easiest method of exerci sing power. All A 
need do i s  redefine the situation such that B percei ves A ' s  
d e f inition of the problem as the j ust one . Secondly, Nation A can 
of fer B a reward for doi ng wha t i� wants . A could intervene 
i n B ' s  de�i sion by offer1' i ng to reward B fo r chasing A ' s desired 
course of act ion • .  Th i rdly, A can threaten B. with punishment 
26 
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Herbert_ Goldhammer a nd Edwin A Shils, " Types of Power and 
States, " The Ame r i can Sociolog i s t, vol. 45 ( 2 ) , p. 17 1. 
( 20 )  
if it does not fol low A� s wish es. Related to reward, punis hment 
threatens a· with some unpleasant conseq uence .  Lastly, A can take 
29 
milita ry action to force B into what it views a des1 r�able decision . 
We s e·e , then, that power can be a subtle thing or a forceful 
thing. However, it c o n sists not only of definitional characteristics , 
but, as a n  ability, it may be enhanced by the posse ssion of certain 
attribute s and instrument s of �ower. Thi s  point leads us to a · 
discussion of a topic of direct concern , military power potenti al. 
Natio nal power is a relationship among states. It is rel�t 1ve. 
It is comparative. Measures of power have no meaning outside a 
compara tive scheme. Saying that State A i s  a great power i s  
meaningle s s, unle s s compared with the national power of another 
state. 
An understanding of national power. and military power 
potenti a l  is mo st u sef ul in understand ing the proce s se s  undertaken 
in this study . Beyond . this, i t  is he l pful to conceive of power 
potent.i als a s  having two components. First, there , are the 
mobilized military capabilities. They are supplie s, weapons and 
., 
personnel ready to be mobi l i zed . Secondly, there are those . fa_ctors 
which confer upon a s t ate the means to further produce m ilitary 
. ,. 
power capabilities. Total power · i s  the surn of the se two factors. 
Together . the mobil i zed a nd t he potentia l ly mob i l1 zed . rorm t he 
. J O  power component. 
29 
A . F . K .  Orga nsk i ,  pp . 105-107. 
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The h i st o ry o f  mi l i tary powe r po tent i a l  a s  a c o ncept i s  a 
rat her abbrevia ted one . The c o nc ept d i d not gai n  appre c i able . ,  
currency unt i l  after World Wa r Two . One o f  t he mo re wel l-known 
student s o f  power potent i a l  i s  Klaus Knorr . Hi s typo logy o f  
mi l i tary power potent i a l  i s  our next con s i derat ion . 
Knorr d i stinqu i s he s  t hree ma j or dete rminant s of  mi l i tary 
power potent ial , 1 ) e co nomi c capac i ty ,  2 )  mi l i tary mot ivat i o n  
and J ) admini strat ive compe tenc e . H e  f e e l s  t hat potential l ie s  
within t he quant i ty and qua l i t y  o f  suc h ava.i lable re s ourc e s . 
Re source s w i t h i n  the se ca tago ri e s  are tho se mo st  sui table for  
eff i c i ent i nput into  t he mi l i t ary s e c to r . 
Ec onomi c  capac i ty ha s t o  do  w i t h  produc t i o n  f o r  both c iv i l ian 
and mi l i ta ry use . I t  depend s upon t he quant i ty and quali ty o f  
ava i lable factors of  produc t i on .  He re , . we speak of a state ' s  
labor force , total po pulat i on ,  natural re s o�rce s , capi tal , energy 
re s ource s and the l i ke . Power depend s , al s o , upon the compo s i t i on 
and mix o f  these factor s , a s  we ll  a s  t he speed wi t h  wh i c h  t he se 
Jl  
factors may be  diverted t o  a mob i l i zed mi l i tary . 
Mi li tary mot ivat i on i s  t he wi l l i ngne s s  wi t h  wh i ch member s  
o f  a soc i e ty supply men and re s ourc e s  to  t he mi l i tary .  Knorr 
views it as a mo st important concept , as a nat i o n  may po s s e s s  
enormous economi c  potent ial , but i t  i s  o f  l i ttle m i l i tary worth 
unle s s  t he populace i s  mot ivated to  act a nd i s  able to ma i nta i n  
i t s  mora le . Thus , power i s  no t automat i c . I t  i s  dependent 
upon a wi l l i ngne s s  t o  e nt e r  a c o nf l i c t  s i tuat i on and forgo 
J l  
Ibid . , ·pp . 45-117 . 
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32 
the satisfaction o f  c e rta i n  need s and d emand s . 
Admini strative capa c i ty de termi ne s the e ff i c i e ncy with which 
. . 
m i l i tary g_o o d s  are _ employed. It i s  a measure of the mi l i tary 
sectors' coordinated a c t i o n s . I t  deals with the speed and skill 
wi t h  �h i c h  good s may be utilized and d e c i s i o n s  made . Admin i s trat ive 
potent i a l  l i e s  within t he e ff i c i ency of an ava i lable bureaucra t i c  
organ i zat i o n .  Pe rsons o f  ski l l , i ntel l i genc e and t raining are 
reguired. Wi t h  a rap i d ly chang�ng mi l i tary t e c hno logy ,· mi l i tary 
mobi l i zat i on would c a l l  for unto ld number s  of sk i l l ed bureauc rats ,  
i n  add i t i on to tho se  pre sent ly engage i n  maki ng dec i s i ons affect ing 
t he mi l i tary .
3 3  
I 
Kno rr '  s conceptualization of the determinant s of national _ .  
"°" · . - · � . 
power was . most useful here. It helped iu 1 d e  the s e lect i on o f  
power va�i a1?l e s . The propert i e s  o f  power are innumerable , and 
catagori �a t i o n i s a r i sky _endeavor . Knorr ' s s c he me i s  helpful in  
transfor1:11-ing an intricate struc ture of factors i nt o  a form more 
easily e�pl oyed . 
2 . 2 Evaluating Power Ind i cato r  Variables 
Number of mi l i tary personnel is an i nd i c a t o r  o f  the number 
of troops qui ckly ava i lable f o r  mobi l i zat i on .  The quanti ty of 
men and arm s is a barometer of t he over-all strength of a s tate ' s  
m i l i tary capacity.  
32�� . pp . 1 39-141 .  
33!!:!!.5!� •  PP • 1 1 9-1 36 .  
(23 )  
_The substant ive lite rature i s  f i lled with a�counts o f  the 
importance of maintaining a ready mi l i tary force . Those  po ints 
mad e by Morganthau , in Pol i t i c s  Among Nat i ons , are typi ca1�4 
However ,  one of the few methodologi cal stud i e s  t o  cons ider i t  i s  
that o f  Wayne H. Ferr i s  in � Power Capabi l i t ie s .Q.! Nat i on-Sta te s .  
In thi s exce llent case study , Ferri s make s the  po int that t he 
number o f  mi l i tary personne l i s  one o f  t he few sure mea sure s of 
immed iate � mi l i tary capabi l i tyJ5 
.·. Among t hose factors mo st often cons idered i.s popu lat i on .  
It i s  wide ly supported in  both t he methodologi cal and t he 
substantive l i terature . 
In t he i r  respect ive stud ie s ;  Robe rt Cox and Fe rri s use i t  
a s  one measure o f  nat ional powe r .  Most _ recently , Naz l i  Choucri 
u sed i t  a s  an empt ri cal-analyt i c  too l  in  the examinat i on of the 
I 
�elat i onship  of population and the pro blems  of po l i t ic s  among 
. �  
and between s tate s�6 
Among the f i r s t  to cons ider populat i on as  an e lement o f  
nat ional power was Morganthau . To h im ,  populat i on was an 
effect ive means by whi c h  we can quanti tat ively a s se s s  tho se pure ly 
human factors t hat determine nat ional power�? 
In h.i s  art i c le , " Sc i ence Wi ll Change the Balance o f  Power , "  
,-·, ·.· 
34Hans Morganthau , Po l i t i c s  Amo ng Nat i ons , p .  124 . 
35wayne H .  Ferri s , � Power Capabi l i t i e s  o f  Nat i on-State s ,  
P • JS . 
36 . . Nazli Choucri , Populat i on and Internati onal Vio lence . 
37 . Morgant hau , pp . 124-128 . 
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B . K .  Blount d i scu s se s  t he relat ion s h i p  of new technolog i e s  and 
populat i on.  He note s t hat for the las t  few hundred year s , 
European s.tate s have been the domi nant powers in the world • 
Pre sent day European state s warrant greater internat i onal 
cons iderati on t han t he ir  popu lati on would otherwi se ind i cate . The 
emerging state s of As ia and Africa include many heav i ly populated 
state s ,  yet .the preponderence of powe r sti l l  l i e s  in the United 
State s ,  · the Sovi et . Uni on and We ste rn Europe . 
This . is true due to  the advanced indu s tri a l  e conomi e s  of 
powerful stat e s .  However ,  some fee l t hat t he deve lopment of a 
ne:w technology wi ll bring ultima te power to those state s whi ch 
I 
pos se s s  large populations , a s  the y  can potentially produce 
more t e chni c ians , engineer s  and s c i ent i s t s . For example ,  s i nce 
J8 
" genius appears to turn up random i n  the populat i on of the world , " 
China has the pot ent i al f or produc i ng ten t ime s the number of  
geniuse s_ as does the Un i ted Kingdom . 
Blount conclude s  that population trend s  fav.or t he develop­
ment of great oen�ers of power in As ia . As the populated As ian 
state s , .  such as Ind i a  and Ch ina , indu strially and s c i ent i f i cally 
�� ... :_,."-:; . .  ��.<: : . . . 
"'·'c:c)ba:Et - into t he i r  own they wi ll become the dominant powers . The 




s -and t he Sov i ett Union may remain powers , but the 
small state s of Europe---Britian , Germany , France and The Ne ther­
lands---wi ll s i nk into obs cur,. t y�9 
JSB . K .  Blount , " Sc i ence W i ll Cha nge. the Balance of Powe r , " 
· !h!. � Scient i st , June_ 2 7 , 1 957 , P •  9 . 
39Ibid . 
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Katherine and A . F .K .  Organski have devoted anrl ent i re book 
to the examina t ion of the re la t i onship of power to popula t i on .  
They v i ew populat ion as a n�t i on ' s  greate st re source�O 
If , indeed , one i s  o f  the v i ew that populat ion · �  i s  t he 
greate s t  nati onal a s se t , what can one conc lude?  The Organski s 
make the point that va st numbe rs of able -bodi ed c i t i zens are 
needed to run an effective e conomy . W i thout a large populat ion , 
no state can begin to  pro spe r�1 .  
Popul�ti on l im i t s  the number o f  pe r sons avai lable for 
recrui tment into the m1 l i tary�2 A nat i on pos s e s s i ng a large army 
cap. potentially atta ck o r  defend . �. :  Total populat i on i s  not the 
only fac tor affecting potent ial m i l i tary s trengt h .  Age set s a 
l imit as t o  t he numbe r  of  avai la ble re cru i t s , and , f or many 
state s ,  the c o s t  of f i e ld i ng a large a rmy i s  prohibi t ive . 
Popula t i on ,  ln part , determ ine s  e conomic  wealth�) The excep­
tion s  to  thi s are mo st impo rtant . A state f i l led with starving 
peasant s wi l l  not l ikely be come an i ndu strial power.  In  fact , 
i t  might be said that the except ion i s  more important t han the rule . 
La stly , they point out that a great populat i on improve s do­
me st i c  confidenc e , and creates fear abroad�4 Thi s l s  a qual itat ive 
40 . .  
· Katherine and A . F . K .  Organsk1 , Popula t i on !!!!.!! World 
Power , P • 3 .  
41llli·- · p .  4 
42ll.!S• t P • 1 3 . 
43 . .  ill.!!• 1  P • 1 9  
44 -�- · · p .  2 6 .  
(26) 
aspe c t . Ins p i red men may e:s::ceed no rmal l im i t s . Powe r may 
be c ome a real i ty when m i l l i ons  of indiv i dua l s  are working t oward 
a common goal wi th a c ommon frame of mind . 
Area : 
Hi s to ry has witne s sed the genera l ly uneven deve l o p ­
ment of leve ls of · nat i onal achi evement and inf lue nc e i n  i nter-
nat ional po l i t i c s . The se observa t i ons  have mot iva ted men to 
search f or sat i sfy i ng e xplana t i ons of pa s t  event s _ and to f o rm­
ulate meani ngful hypot h se s wit h  whi c h  t o  pred i c t t he future 
o rde ri ng of po l i t i c a l relat i on s h i p s . Over t he pa s t 88 years , 
nume rou s ge opo l i t i c al hypothe se s have been offerred whi c h  
purport t o  expla i n  i nt e rnat i ona l rea l i ty o n  t he ba s i s  o f  s ome 
45 ma s t e r  va r i ab l e . 
Ge opo l i t i cal hypot he s i s bu i ld ing repre s ent s e f f ort s  t o  
i d e nt i fy a d e c i s ive f a c t o r  or a l imi ted numbe r of fa c t o rs , t he 
uneven d i stri bution O f  Wh i c h , i n  ma n s  l iv i ng space , provide s 
t he key t o  unde rs t�nd i ng the pa s t  and pred i c t i ng t h e  future . 
Whi le mo s t  fact ors have fallen v i c t im to  severe c r i t i c i sm and 
an advanc i ng te c hno logy , na t i o na l  a rea c ont i nue s t o  gather 
support as a na t i onal power de terminant . 
Extreme c l a ims f o r  a geopo l i t i ca l ba s i s of nat i o nal power 
i nc lude t ho se vo i cE!d by Si r Hal f o rd Maaki nd er .  Macki nder•s 
view was that geography favored t he eventual emergence of a 
globa lly dominant emp i re located i n  the " heart land � a reg i on 
45 . . 
. 
Haro ld Sprout , " Geo gra phi ca l Hypo t he se s  in Te c hno lo�i c a l  
Pe rspec t i ve , "  Wo rld Po l i t i c s ,  Ma rc h 196 3 , p .  1 8 6 . 
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roughly occupied by the Soviet Un ion . Hi s view wa s summed up 
in  h i s famou s maxim : "Who ru les Eastern Euro pe command s the heart-
land, who r u l e s t he h e l;l.r t l and c.ommand s the world-i s land ; who 
46 
rules the world -island commands t he world. " 
The approach of th i s  paper is much m o r e  mo�era.te. In fact, 
Mackinder modified and a.H-e rred hi s views short ly bef ore his 
d eath . However, because of a number of cons i derat i ons, area 
is used in this study. 
Area doe s not automatically confer powe r upon a s tate . 
This must be under sto od . Howeve r ,  it i s  a powerful influence. 
Fo r example, i t  su re l y  i s  no acc i dent t ha t  the world ' s  two 
i superpowers are both large in area. Nor is i t  acc i dental t ha t  
n o  small states are grea t  power s . Some m i d dle sized states have , 
at a certain time in their history, attained gre a t  power . How-
eve r , as was the case w i th Great Britian, t he se middle s i z e d  
states ruled colonial empires and controlled a large land mass . 
Area can functi on a s  both a po sitive 1 nfluPnce and a neg-
ative inf lence. A large , unpopulated land ma s s  may turn into 
an economic burden, c o s t ly in t e rm of transportaion and defense . 47 
Howeve r ,  as Napo le o n  and H i t l e r  discovered i n  Russia, a large 
land ma ss can make conventi o nal conquests impossible. The Soviet 
Union contai�s one -seventh . of the world ' s  land ma ss. To conquer 
Russia would !equire increa.sing numbers of troops spread over 
46 
Hans W .  We i gert , "Ma ck i nd e r ' s Heartland, "  The American 
Scholar, · Winte r 1 94 5 , p .  45 . · 47 ·  
Knorr, Mi l i tary Powe r and Potential, p. J6. 
( 28 ) 
an ever larger area inha b i ted by a hostile na t ive po pulat i on .  
Clearly, area wa s a pro hibitive f a c t or. 
A large land ma s s  ma ke s po s sible the support of a large 
4 8 
popula t i on and a var i ed supply of natural res ources . Area, 
here, re pre sents a potential. 
Among t h� se stress ing the r e lated loca t ion and distribution r 
of raw materials have been Brooks EmellY and Ro bert Strausy-Hupe . 
Emeny f elt that only a limited number of states possessed the 
size nec essa ry to potentially po s sess a complex base o f  raw 
material s. Thus, only a few states could ever a c h i eve the status 
49 
o f  great powe r .  On the ba s i s  of s u ch · th i nking, Strausi-Hupe 
predicted, in 1945 , tha t by 197 0  the world ' s  major powe rs mi ght 
we l l  consi s t  of the United State s, the Soviet Union and an 
50 
industrially united We stern Europe . 
A large, united land ma s s  i s  evid ence t ha t  a state posse sses 
the people , mot iva t i o n ,  ski lls, resources and mi litary capabi l i ty 
t o  govern. That it e xists i n  tact , symbolizes the fact that a 
state doe s  possess a certain power . 5 1 
Thus, area i s  a factor a f f e c t i ng nationa l power. I t  cannot 
be used as an index in i t self ; but only in c ombinat i o n  with a 
num ber of other fac\;rs. 
48 
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I n  t o d a y ' s  age o f  nuc le a r  weaponry , area wi l l  a l l ow pop­
ula t i on d i s pe r s i on so t ha t  s t ra t e g i c  nuc l e a r s t r ike s are of a 
le s s formidi ble magn i tude . A . mo re a dv an c e d  tec hno l o gy may s ome ­
day rend e r  i t  o f  no impo rta nce , but today i t  st i l l  p o s s e s s e s  
s ome e ffe c t . 
Food ProQ.ucti on : 
I t  i s  mo s t  n e c e s s a ry t o  c o n s i d e r  a natura l re s our c e -
raw mater i a l  vari a bl e . Wi t hout c e rt a i n  m i ne r a l  re s ourc e s  i ndu s t r i a l  
product i on i s  not po s s i ble . From t h i s i t  f o l l ows t ha t  wi thout 
t he po s se s s i o n  of c e rta i n  raw mate r i a l s-re s ource s ,  a s tate w i l l  
b e  i l l-prepa red both t o  d efend i t s e l f  a ga i n s t  a ggre s s o r s  and 
to wage wa r .  
The u s e  o f  raw mat e r i a l s  a s  a p owe r var i a ble l e ad s t o  a 
s t r i ng . o f  problems . I t  i s  not e a s y  t o  c o n s t ruc t a ba lance s he e t  
of re sourc e s .  
The pro �lem be g i n s  w 1 t h · t he very nature o f  what c o n s t i tute s 
a raw ma ter i al . We may f e e l  we know wha t i s  and what i s  no t  a 
raw mate r i a l , but t h i s k_nowledge c a n  o n l y  be superf i c i a l  f o r  
res ourc e s  range f rom nu t r i ent -� product s a n d  �i ber s , ,. t o  fue l s  and 
metal s .  The s e , in turn , requ i re a wide var i et y  of a c t i vi t i e s  t o  
make t he m u s e fµ l . 
What i s  o f  va lue i s  determ i ne:l by man ' s l eve l 
·
o f  technology . 52 
Ha s so c i et y  devel oped t he t e c hn o l o gy and sk i ll ne c e s sary t o  
capitali ze o n  ava i lable resourc e s ?  Or d o e s t he raw materi a l  
52 
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rema i n  a pot ent i a l  re s e rv e ?  Nature prov i d e s u s  w i t h  an op­
portuni t y  and a potent i a l . Howeve r ,  f ew �e s ourc e s  are ea s i ly 
at tainable . Man mu s t  develop . t he me a n s  by whi c h  to e xpl o i t  a 
re s ource . Pet roleum l i e s  deeo i n  t he Eart h ' s c ru s t  and mus t  be 
m i ned t hrough s o ph i s t i c a t e d  t e c h n i q ue s .  Pre c i o u s  met a l s are o f  
value only i f . t he y  ca n b e  ret r i eved . 
Tec hrio l o gy , furt h e r , det e rm i ne s  what r e s o urc e s  are o f  value . 
Dur i ng t he s i xteent h a nd sevent e e nt h  c e nt u r i e s ,  wo od �a s wide l y  
u sed i n  i ndu s t ry .  Tod a y ,  o i l  i s  o f  grea t s i gn i f i c a nc e , but 
in t he early e i ght e e n t h  century i t  meant l i t t le .  A c entury ago , 
suc h  synt he t i c  metal s a s  a lumi num a nd ma gne s i um we re unknown . 
Tod ay ' s  t e c hnology and human wa nt s nearly requ i re t hem . I n  
s hort , a l i s t  o f  re s o urc e s i s  governed by t e c hno l o g i c a l  progre s s .  
It i s  f o r  t he s e  rea s o n s  that t h i s aut hor ha s c ho s e n  t o  u s e  
a f ood va r i a bl e  a s  t he re source vari able . I t  seems t o  be a more 
stable f a c t o r . It i s  t he mo st e leme ntal o f  a l l  re s ource s .  
Man cannot l i ve wi t hout i t .  
Hi story record s the adva nt a ge o f  t he s e l f -suff i c i ent s t a t e . 
Suc h stat e s need no t import f o o d s t uf f s  t o  f eed t he i r populat i on s . 
They a re not d epend e n t  upon t he e f f i c i e nt funct i o n i ng o f  a no t he r ' s  
farming system ,  anot he r ' s c apr i c ou s  l e ad e r s h i p , nor an o pe n  s e a 
lane . Suc h  stat e s  need not d ivert t he i r  f o re i gn p o l i c i e s  f rom 
· the i r  pr imary obj ect ive s in o rder to make s ure t he i r  populat i on s  
wi l l  n o t  s t arve i n  ca s e  of c o nf l i ct .  
Hans Mo rgant'hau p r ov i d e s  u s  wi t h  t h e s e  example s o f  t he 
i mporta nc e o f  . f o od . Bef o re Wo rld Wa r Two , Great Br i t t a n  grew 
only JO% of t he f o o d  c o n sumed i n  t he Br i t i s h  I s l e s . Thu s , s he 
( J l ) 
5J 
wa s dependent upon unre s t ra i ned s hi pp�, for v i tal food suppl i e s . 
The agri cultural systems of t he Middle Eas t  a nd Nort h Afri ca 
were ba sed on i rr i gat i on .  Ac c o rd i ng t o  Morga.nthau , o ne can 
trace  t he par�alle l s between the dec l i ne i n  powe r of  Babylon , 
54 
Egypt and t he Ar.abs and .t he ru i n  o f  i rr i gat i on systems . The 
d i sappearance of regu l a ted i rr i gat i on syst ems t ran s f o rmed a l l  . . 
the arable land s ,  except t ho se near t he N i l e  River , i nt o  
v i rtual de sert . 
Abundant food i s  a s ource of  st rengt h .  Conve rse ly , pe rm-
55 ane nt scarc i ty i s  a sourc e  of  pe rmanent weakne s s .  Food 
ava i lab i l i t y  as a source o f  power i s  a re lat ively stable fact o r .  
' 
' 
I nd i a , toda y , i s  a ge o graph ically large and populou s  state . It  
po s s e s s e s  many as set s o f  nat i onal power . However , fd i an lead er-
sh i p and po l i cy mus t  c o nc e rn i t s e l f  wi t h  t he constant t h reat o f  
ma s s  starvat i on • .  Fo r lack o f  f o o d , a great potenti a l  goe s  
unrea l i zed . 
What i s  t he hi s t o r i cal re lat i o n s h i p  o f  man t o  h i s f o od s ?  
I n  � and Man , M i r i am Lowenbe rg addre s sed t h i s problem .  
Lowe nberg stat e s  t hat f o r  t he na st  10 , 00 yPars  man ha s fed 
u p o n  gra in s . 56 Furt he r , "gra in ha s been t he wo r ld ' s  c hief food 
5J < 
. Morga nt hau , p . 1 1 5 .  
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throughout h i story . " Gra i n i s  a h i gh -ca l o ri c f o o d  pro duct that 
has t he advantage of  be i ng c hP a pe r  t han meat . Man may l ike 
me a t , but when food i s  s ho rt .and l a nd scarce for pa st ure , . he can  
57 and mu s t  f e e d  on gra i n s . Add i t i o na l l y , l ivestbc� : feed on 
gra i n s .  The refore , gra i n  product i o n  i s  a key to t he food supply . 
Gra i n  can be consumed o r  i t  can be d ive rt ed t o  l ive st ock prod uc t i on . 
Ei t he r way , t he better  part o f  man ' s  f o o d  supply · i s depe ndent 
upon h i s  staple gra i n s . 
The mea sure u s ed h e re i s  t he sum o f  the met ri c t ons pro -
duc t 1 on o f  c o rn ,  ri c e  and whe at pe r c a p i t a  per year . It mea sure s 
dome st i c  pro d uct i o n  and doe s not take i nt o  ac count t h o s e  f o od -
, I 
s tuf f s  imported at the me rcy o f  a no t her state . I t  i s  a mea sure 
o f  a state s self-suff i c i e nt f o od supply . But , .t here are ' 
l imi tat i o ns t o  i t s  val i d i ty .  Fo od habi t s  are i nf lu�nced by 
re l i gi on ,  culture. and geography . But , perha ps  thi s c ombinat i o n  
o f  gra i ns w i l l  outwe i gh thi s f a c t o r . P l u s , t here are few 
re l ig i o u s  re st rict i ons  involving cereal s .  
· .: :· . 
What o f  t he future relat i ons h i p  of food supply ·and nat ional 
power?  In Fam i ne -1 9 7 5 , W i l l i am a nd Paul Paddock addre s s  t hem-
selves to t h i s que st i on .  The i r  opinion a s  agr i c u l t u ra l  �xpert � . : �  
• . '!-. .. . - .:��· : -�� · ·:<. ·· . . . >,:·.. � - ·- � . .  i s  t ha t  we are h e a d e d  f o r  an una'V'o i dable f o o d -populat i on c o l l i s ion • .  ·; . · :;_: 
It  l s  i nev i table . The re sul t  wi l l  be ma s s  s t a rvat i o n i n A s i a ,  
Africa and La t i n  Ame r i ca c oupled w i t h  revo lut i o n  a nd mas s  so c i al 
58 turmo i l . 
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They e nv i s i on a wo rld i n  wh i c h  i nterna t i o na l  po l it i c s  
wi l l  be ba sed upon t he allocat i on o f  surplu s foods  by s e lf -
suff i c i ent s t a t e s  t o  a s e l e ct few o f  t he many starv i ng . They 
forsee an Age o f  Fo od i n  wh i c h  f o od i s  no t o n ly l i f e , but wea lth  
59 
and powe r .  To t he Paddocks , t he Uni ted St at e s  s eems u�iquely 
sui ted to  be t h e  d om i na nt power of suc h a n  e ra .  The Uni ted State s 
can furt her he r own s e l f - i ntere s t s  t hrough t he s e l e c ted d i s -
tribut i on o f  her l imi ted food s t o ck s . Whe t her t he Un i ted Sta t e s  . . 
wi ll make good of t h i s c hance de pend s upon whe t he r  s he can over-
come ma ny d i f f i cult p s y c ho logi cal  pro blems a s s o c i ated  wi t h  t he use 
60 
o f  f ood a s  a persuader . 
Food , t hen , i s  a good c ho i ce . I t  i s  nec e s sary and i t  appear s  
a stable f a ct o r . Relat ively..,a f f e c t ed b y  c hang i ng t e c hnology , i t  
provi de s  u s  w i t h  a vari able o f  c o n s t a nt importanc e . 
Gro s s  Dome st i c  Product : 
Gro s s  dome st i c  product  i s  gro s s  nat i o na l  produc t  m i nu s  
trade va lue . It  i s  a u s e ful powe r  i ndex t hat mea sure s t he t o tal 
product ive C a pac i ty o f  a n  e conomy . In t i me of  wa r ,  t he end u s e  
o f  t hat  capa c i ty c a n  b e  s h i ft ed f rom c ivi l i an good s t o  mi l i tary 
good s .  
Gro s s  d o me st i c  product ( G . D .P . · ) ha s not been · popu la�ly · u sed 
in,  nat 1 9na l power stud t e s .  Mo st � have cho s e n : · to . use gro s s .:.. - �  
nat i o nal produc t . An except i on i s  Marshall R . Si nge r .. 1 n  Weak 
Stat e s  in a Wo rld o f  Power s . Si nger sugge s t s  t he u s e  of  G . D . P .  
59Ibtd .' ,  p . 232 . 
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a s  an i nd i ca t i on o f  " relative man i f e st wealt h . �
61 
G . D . P .  was c ho s en f o r  t hree  ma i n  rea sons , 1 )  a s  a pract i ca l  
matter ·, be:t ter data wa s ava i la bl e  f o r  G . D . P .  t han G , N . P . , 2 )  
s i nce trade value i s  u sed also , t he use  o f  G. D . P. rat he r  t han 
G . N . P .  reduc e s  t he re� t 1 t i o n  of data , and 3 )  by c o n s i dering 
G . D . P .  and t . v .  separate ly ,  we s e parate the  dome st i c  aspe c t  
from t h e  i nternat i onal . The dome st i c  fa cto r  l s  a s ourc e o f  
s t rengt h ,  wh i le t he internat i on� l factor . i s potent i a l  weakne s s .  
Trade value : 
Trade value l s  defi ned a s  t he sum o f  a state ' s annua l 
import s and i t s  annua l export s .  It  i s  an e c o nomi c re s ource , 
' ' ' 62 
and an i nd i cator of e c o nomi c  capac i t y .  
Th i s  i nt erna t i ona l  trade fi gure enabl e s  sta t e s  to acq u i re a 
larger nat i o nal produc t t han they would o t h e rwi se  obtai n .  State s  
produce goo d s  and· serv i c e s  for e xport i n  wh i c h  t hey have a c om -
parat ive adva ntage and , i n  turn , i mport product s a nd serv i c e s  ' 6J 
that would requ i re a greater outlay o f  i nd i genou s  re s ource s .  
Trade va lue as a nat i onal power attribute ha s no t e n j oyed t he 
popular support a c cord e d  such  o t he r  fact o rs a s  popula t i on and 
area . I t s  acceptance ha s been more rec e nt . R . J .  Rummel used -
! 
i t  i n  � Dime n s i ons  o f  Nat i ons , and Knorr s peaks o f  it  i n  � 
!!!!, Potent i a l  of Nat i on s . Ferri s cons idered i t  i n  � Power 
61 
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a abi l i t i e s  of  Nat i on-State s .  
As wa s d i s cu s sed in an ear l i er sect i on , a state ' s  power may 
in pa rt , upon t he admi ni s trative capabi l i ty i t s  authori t i e s  
This facto r  i s  n o t  ea s i ly quant i f i ed , and t rade value 
us here . Sta t e s  w i t h  hi ghly advanced economie s are 
�ike ly to e ngage in greater i nternat i o nal t rade to supply the i r  
! populat i o n s  wi t h  d i ver s i f i ed ma t e r i a l s ,  product s and serv i c e s  re -
qu i red to ma i ntain an advanced e c·onomy . Th i s  h i p.:h degree of 
i 
. 
interna t i o nal t rade req u i re s ski l led admi n i s t rative per sonne l 
I 
who c onduct e f f i c i e nt t rade act i v i t i e s .  I n  t ime of cri s i s ,  
the s e  admini s t rat ive personne l c ould be s h i fted to mee t  t he need s 
I 
o f  governme nt . Thu s , t rade value can be v i ewed a s  · a  rough mea sure 
o f  a state ' s admini strative ca pac i t y . 
Trade value do e s  have a weakne s s  a s  t o  our use . I n  c erta in 
ca se s , a la rge tr�de va lue may be t he re sult  of a state ' s 
depende nc e  upon import s for nece s sary goods . This would i nd i c ate 
a weakne s s . Thi s  fact , however , va r i e s f rom state t o  state and 
wi t h  i ndividual c i rcums tanc e s . Th i s  f ac t , however , s hould not 
d i squalify trade va lue s a s  a f a c t o r  for all state s •  I t s  use i n  
combi nat i on wi t h  othe r t nd i cat o rs s hould s u f f  iO i Ant ly counter-
act t h i s weakne s s . For our purpos e s  it  i s  a mo st  u s e ful 
determinant . 
2 � 3  A s se s sment � Powe r Va r i a b l e  Blend 
Why have t hese s i x  va r i a bl e s  been c h o s e n ?  The rea sons go 
beyond t ho se s tated above . All but our food var i able have been 
me nt i oned l n  the substant ive l i te rature and u sed i n  o ne met hod-
o logical approach or  a not her . To ge t h e r , t he s e s i x  v a r i a b l e s  f o rm 
( J6 ) 
an effect ive mea sure o f  power t hat goe s  beyond t he i r i nd ividua l 
c o nt r i but i o n s . Con s i de red toge t he r , t he y  c ompl ime nt eac h o t her , 
and a l low one to  i nf e r  certain o t he r  re levant vari ab le s . The s e 
s i x  take i nto a c c ount both mobi l i zed m i l i tary capab i l i t i e s  and 
po tent ial  capabi l i ti e s . Furt he r , t hey cove r , by d i re c t  mea sure 
or i nferenc e , each o f  Kno rr ' s  t hree ma j or d e terminant s  of mi l i tary 
. ,  
power potent i a l . Some of t he i nf o rma t i o n s tated be l ow i s  re -
·. 
peated), f rom the above s e c t i ons f or added empha s i s , a nd in ' orde r  
t o  make a ne ce s sa ry po i nt . 
The numbe r of  mi l i tary pe r s o nne l i nd i cat e s  t he f o rc e s - in­
be i ng .  It re c o rd s  t he number of  able bod i ed individua l s  
' 
immed iate ly ava i lable for mobi l i zat i on aga i ns t  a nothe r sta te . 
Defense expend i ture s ,  ano t her mea sure o f  mo b i l i zed capabi l i t i e s , 
could a l s o  have been used , but lack of data wa s pro h i b i t ive . 
However , in  The Dimen s i o n s  o f  Nat i on pro j ec t , Rumme l determ i ned 
correlat i on coeff i c ient s for a l l  pa i r s  of t he 2 36 nat i on-state , ,  
variabies  employed . He ha s d et e rmi ned a c o rre lat i o n  coeff i c i ent 
of . Bo between number o f  m i l i ta ry personne l and defense ex-
64 
pend i ture s .  A s  a rule , t he greater the number o f  m i l i tary 
per sonnel ,  t he greater t he amount of re sourc e s  a l located to  
the i r  t ra i n i ng and equ i pment . 
Mobi l i z ed capabi l i t i e s  are not , in  t h e m s e lve s , e nough . 
Thi s i s  whe re potent i a l  capabi l i t i e s  e nt e r  t he p i c ture . 
Populat i on re pre sent s  a state ' s potent i a l  for mobi l i zed 
... . 
tro o ps . Some may argue that nuc lear wea pons vo ia t he impo rtance 
64 
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o f  t roop s . However ,  even i n  our nuc lear  a ge ,  terr i t o ry i s  s t i ll  
i nvaded by  manpower . r t � t s taken a nd defe nded by troops . I t  
i s  a def i n i t e  advantage . Aga i n , a l arge po pulat i on can be d i ­
ve rted t o  m i l i tary s e rv i c e  a s  we l l  a s  t o  t he ta sk o f  supplyi ng 
a rmed forc e s ,  and act ivating an e co nomy . 
Area i s  a factor wh i c h  i s  relat ively s t able over t ime . A 
large area repre sent s a potent i a l  f o r  va r i ed re sourc e s .  If 
) 
a state . ho ld s a numbe r o f  colon i e s , i t  re f l ec t s  t hat states  ) 
m i l i tary mo t ivat i on, a s  . su stai ne d  morale i s  ne c e s sary t o  hold 
a nd gove rn a large area . 
Another stable f a c t o r  i s  our f o od vari able . I t  i s  a re -
s ource vari able . I t  repre sent s both  an i mmed i ate supply of 
t he mo s t  e lemental re s ou rce  var i able , and t he po tent i al abi l i ty 
t o d ive rt f o o d s tuff s to the mi l i t ary wit hout seri o u s ly affect i ng 
c i v i l i an f o od suppl i e s .  
Bo th gro s s  dome s t i c  produ c t ( G � D . P . ) and trade value are 
measure s of government revenue and e conomi c capac i ty .  G . D . P .  
ref lect s t h e  wea l t h  o f  a state ' s  e conomy .  Product ive economi c s  
can potent i al ly supply more re s ourc e s t o  t he mi l i tary and an 
act ive economy � provide s taxe s .  Trade value , al s o , /  e nlarge s t he 
nat i onal product . 
Simi larly ,  bo t h  var i able s  i nd i cate a mea sure of  admini s tat ive 
capac i ty .  Skil led pe r sonne l are needed i n  t he e conomi c and 
po l i t i cal sectors  to e f f i c i antly c o nduct the dome s t i c e conomy 
and matters of internat i onal trade . 
Las tly , a s  an example , l i te ra�1 would be ref lec t'ed i n-
d i re c t ly i n  mea sure s o f  e conomi c wea l t h . Thu s , t h i s e c o nomi c 
re s ource mi ght ind i re c t l y  i nd i c a t e  s omet h i ng about a human 
( J S )  
re source . 
2 . 4  Certa i n  Factors Def y  Quant i f i cat ion : The Exampl e  o f  
Dec i s i on-Mak i ng Pro �e s se s  
The numbe r o f  fac t o rs affe c t i ng nat i o nal power s e ems end ­
le s s .  The c ho i ce of  t ho se to u s e  i n  bu i ld i ng a ma t r i x  o f  power 
variable s i s  mo st d i f f i cult . Howeve r ,  t he c o n�uct of t h i s 
opera t i on requi re s  quant i f i cat i on .  Thi s  f a c t  alone l im i t s  t he 
c ho i ce s .  For i nc lu s i o n  i n  t h i s s tudy , a va ri able mus t  neatly lend 
i t self to stat i s t i cal tec hnique s .  
To i l lu s t rate the d i ff i culty , o r  near impo s s i b i l i ty ,  of 
quant ifying c e rta in relevant fac t o r s  seems appropr i at e . For 
purpo s e s  of  i l lu s t ra t i o n , let us c o n s i d e r  wha t Knorr te rms t he . 
65  
dec i s i on-maki ng compe tence of a s tate ' s  leaders h i p .  A general 
d i scu s s i o n  of the dec i s i on-maki ng proce s s  and dec i s i on-making 
anal ys i s  wou ld be st  serve to  i llu s t rate h ow t h i s factor e lude s 
quant i f i cat i on .  
Dec i s i on-maki ng ana lys i s  i s  centur i e s old , however dec i s i on 
t heory real ly began i n  l. 9 55 when a mat hme t i c i an ,  John von N'euman , 
and an economi s t , O skar Morganstern ,  · publ i s hed t he i r  book e'1-
t 1 t led � Theory o f  Game s � Eco nomi c Be hav i o r . The i r  conc e rn 
for t he ut i l i ty of  alterna t ive c ho i ce s  1 n  t he e conom i c  realm 
st imulated re searc h e ff o rt s in psychology , bu s i ne s s , ph i l o sophy , 
and somewhat belatedly , pol i t i c� l  s c i e nce . 
What i s  de c i s i on-making? · · It. can be d e f i ned a s  t he act  tof 
6 5 
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cho o s ing among ava i lable alternat ive s ,  about whi c h  a certain amount 
66 
of uncert a i nty exi st s .  Thi s  de f in i t i on impli e s  t hat  t he de -
c i s ion pro ce s s  invo lve s a gamble and a c o n s equenc e .  I t  furt her 
impl i e s  t hat  dec i s i on-maki ng i s  a f o rm of m i c ro -analy s i s  whi c h  
mus t  cons i der bot h  the ind ividua l c ha ra c t e ri st i c s  o f  dec i s i on- 1 
67 
maker s  and t he sa l i ent feature s o f  t he dec i s i onal env i roment . · 
A bri e f  cons i de ra t i on o f  bo t h  o f  t he se fac t ors  i s  revea l i ng a s  to 
our mai n  po i nt � 
The be hav l or o f  state s i s  d et e rmi ned by the emo t i on ,  de s i re s ,  
i d e a s  and a s p i rat i ons o f  those i n  po s i t i o n s  o f  lead e r s h i p .  The se 
very human de c i s i on-maker s  are affected by a numbe r of i ndivi dual 
and soc i a l var i a ble s .  
. 
Y1rsti dec i s i ons  a re affected by t he rat i onal i ty of  t he 
d ec i s i on-make r .  Dec i s i on-theory i nv o lve s t he age -o ld que s t  o f  
t he s o c i a l  phi l o�opher for t he power re lat i on s h i p  of human act i onr: 
68  
t o  reason . Epi stomo l og i cal rat i onal i s t s  and eth i c a l  rat ion-
69 
a l i s t s a rgue t hat rea s o n  i s  the key t o  human knowledge , and t he 
· .  7 0  
road t o  proper act i on .  Others , such .  a s  Bac on ,  a n  emp i r i y i st ,  
66 
Jame s E .  Doughe rty , Contend i ng The o r i e s  £[ Internat i onal 
Re lat i ons , p . )12 .  
67 
Ibid . , p .  31 5 .  
68 . 
Wayne Lee ,  Dec i s i on 
69 
7 0  
Ibid . , p .  2 .  
Ibid . , p .  6 .  
Theo ry and Human Be hav i o r , p . J .  
( 40 )  
and Benth'.':"'am , a ut i l i ta r i an ,  warned o f  t he l imi t s  of such 
7 1  
t h i nking . 
Second l y , dec i s i on s  a re ba sed upon o ne ' s  percept i on s  of  
t he fact s . · Percept i on i s  d e pendent upon o u r  noto r i o u sly fa l l i ble 
72 
sense s .  Given that percept i on ( a nd t hu s  real ity ) i s  re lat i ve 
to t he observ�r ,  and t ha t  our s en s e s  can give us  only an approx­
imat i on ot rea l i ty ,  i t  i s  not d i f f i cult to understand t he d i s ­
tort i ng effect  percept i on can have upon the d ec i s i on-maki ng 
proc e s s .  
Thi rdly , d ec i s i on s  are a ff e cted by t he persona l i ty o f  t he 
d ec i s i on-make r .  I n  The Psycho l o g i c a l  Dimen s i ons  of  F'ore i gn 
i 
Po l i cy ,  Jo seph de Rive ra outl i ne s numerous  importa nt f a c e t s  of  
7 3  
one ' s persona l i ty whi c h  affect t he d e c i s i o n -maki ng pro ce s s .  
Fourthly , how d o  i nd iv i dual s and group s  re spond t o  t he 
.pre s sure : and tens ion o f  c ri s i s ?  Do t hey re s pond t o  t he stre s s  
wi t h  hi gh· mot ivat i o n , a keen sense  o f  purpo se a nd e nhanced 
crea t i v i t y ?  or , i s  our capac i ty seriously  impa i red ? P sycholo­
g i s t s  have s pent a great deal o f  t ime s tudy i ng t he effec t s  o f  
s t re s s .  The y  have muc h  t o  say a s  c oncern s  t he re lat i on s h i p  o f  
. . . , . .  
s t re s s  to t he perspe c t ive and a daptabi l i ty of  dec i s i on-makers . 
Lastly , dec i s i ons a re affec ted by suc h s o c i a l  phenomena as  
group pre s sure and i ntergroup conf l i c t . Dec i s i on s  made i n  




Ibi d . , p . 4 .  
Ro s s  Stagner , P s y c h o logi ca l A spe c t s  o f  Interna t i onal 
Conf l i c t , p .  9 . 
Jo Reph d e  Rivera , The P s y c h o l o � i c a l Dime n s i o n s  of 
Fore i P,n Po l i cy , p .  166 . 
(41 ) 
1 ind ividua l not to  dev i a t e  far from t he group dec i s i on .  Simi larly ,  
1c ompe t i  t i  on · between groups ma y c a u s e  t he c o n f l i c t  t o  bec ome more 
. 74 
-
impo rtant t han the d e c i s i o n i t se l f . 
Thu s , _  we see t ha t  a dec i s i on -maker suff e r s  ser i ou s  l im i tat i ons . 
1�e i s  constra i ned by t he l imi t s  o f  rat i ona l i ty ,  pe rceptual d i s ­
tort i on , pe rsona l i ty ,  s t re s s  and s o c i a l  c haracteri s t i c s  • .  Even 
thi s bri e f  gla nc e  at  t he dec i s i on-making pro ce s s  make s obvious  
� he non-quant i tative nature of t hat proc e s s . It i s  not pre sently 
pos s i bl e  to quant ify and stat i s t i c a l ly c ompare d ec i s i on s . 
Thi s�not an i so lated ca. se . Other fac t o r s  o f  nat i o nal power 
do not lend t hems e lve s to quant i f i cat i on , and , t hu s , c ould not 
l be c ons id�red for u s e  i n  t h i s study . 
74 
Kennet h  Kni ght , Dec i s i on-Making i n  � C hang i ng World , pp . 52 -57 . 
CHAPTER J 
3 . 1 Expo s i t i on of Data Sect i ons 
Data Chart s : 
Thi s  c hapter i s  devoted to  t hree tasks , ( 1 ) pre sen­
tation of the raw data,  ·(2 ) graphi c  analys i s ,  and (J ) pre senta­
tion of the result s  of t-te st analys i s . · Chapter f our contains 
. our conclu s i ons . 
Data c hart s contain informat i on u sed in thi s operat ion .  
Informat ion recorded f o r  each DS group include s t h e  name of 
dispute s considered , t he year of the d i s pute , the partie s to the 
di spute and , for each variable , the value , as s caled ,
· 
o f  t he 
absolute d iffe rence between variable value s . For added c lari ty ,  
each variable group data h a s  been summed , and t he mean de termined . 
DS °I and DS II  data appear on page s 4J-45 , and DS II I and 
) 
DS IV data appear on page s 46-48 . In read ing from left to r�ght 
over three page s ,  one may �o te that within group N varie s .  Thi s  
was tak�n into acc ount i n  ha:ndling data.  
(43 ) 
DATA CHARTS 
. ! �pulat 1on---DS I 
, :�xpre s sed in t housands ) 
� Disputants Pop . Difference 
,. 
, banon-Jordan 1 .  
· C1v1 1 War 2 . 
' benz Ou ste-r 
U.wa1t Independence 
,"anaian Borde r · 
. '4uri tania-, :':! 1 Morocco Borde r 
Eani sh Sahara �kland I s land s  tanga Exi le s  .mihican Mora l  
� Aggre s s ions 
leruvian Borde r 
Inva s i on of  Ha i t i  
l;u�ca Rive r 
eaar 
DS I I  
Algerian 
Inde pendence 
Laos Civ i l War 
Somali Borde rs 1 .  
2 .  
Cambod ian Bo rde r 
Corfu Chann� l 
Panama Canal { UN )  
Caribbean Plo t s  
Panama Canal ( OAS ) 
Algerian-Morocco 
Borde r 
rrench in Levant. 
Sarawak/Sa bah 


















1 963 . 













U . S . -Guatemala 




Sp . Sahara-Morocco  
U .K . -Argent ina 
Congo- Be lgium 
Domin i c an Bepubl i c -U . s  . .  
Peru-Ecuador 
Hai t i -Dominican Republ ic 
Bol ivia-Ch i le 
France -We st Ge rmany 
2 7 33 
2703 
1 56 , 578 
.52 , 603 
2 787 
1 0 , 8 99 
1 2 , 632 
J2 , 1 91 
4 , 996 





Sum diff  . =48 9 , 1 3 1 Mean d i f f  . =J4 , 9J8 
F·rance -Alge ria J l , 570 
Lao s -N .  Viet Nam l J , 410 
Somalia -Et h i opia 1 9 , 500 
Somalia-Kenya 6547 
Cambodia-s . Viet Nam 12 , 170  
U . K . -Albania 4? , 965 
Panama-u , s .  1 90 , 934 
CUba-u. s .  173 , 873 
Panama-u . s .  1 90 , 934 
Alge ria-Morocc o . 1065 
Lebanon-France J8 , 850 
U .K . -Malay s i a  44 , 788 
Syri a-F.gypt 2 1 , 665 
SUm. d1ff . =7 9J , J7 1 Mean diff . =61 , 02 9  
lote : The symbol ( * )  ind i cate s that a va lue c ou ld not be 
determ. ined due to the unava i la b i l ity of data . 
. .  l 
Area Diffe rence 
( sq .  m i le s )  
67 , 483 
33 , 760 
3 , 637 ,.344 
81 0 , 061 
13 , 769 
225 , 542 
69 ,.7 1 1 
351 , 67 9 
839 , 675 
J , 662 , 1 31 
J86 , 7q.1 
8�, 1 02 
1 31 ' 907 
4;, 255 , 856 . 
Hc:;t4·:i 
Sum=14 , 493 , ?61 
Mean=l , 035 , 2 68 
J , 432 , 222 .  
J0 , 135 
225 , 578 
2 1 , 240 
J , 949 
2 , 383 , 580 
J , 651 , 738 
J , 636 , 72 9 
3 651 738 7�7 , 181 
4 , 551 , 7 12 
132 , 809 
31 5 , 1 64 
N.=1 3  
SUm=l 6 , 100 , 2 99 
Mean=l , 238 , 484 
(44 )  
G . D . P . Difference 
(mi llion U . S .  $)  
249 
47 5 
3 1 9 , 222 
1 63 , 404 
1 , 472 
1 7 1 9 
* 




2 , 2 56 
1 8 , 634 
?1=1 3 
SUm.=1 , 2 1 9 , 082 
Mean=93 , 77 6 







595 , 441 
* 
595 , 441 
1 14 
� . . , • -� 1 : ·, 
• "  .. 1 . " 
1 68 , 1 1 7  
72 1 
N•9 
Sum=l ;  391, 1 08 
Mean=1 54 , 568 
M11itar� Personne l 
(number 
33 , 450 
1 6 , 1 88 
2 , 996 , 414 
577 , 700 
9 000  
24 , 1 00 
225 , 000 
369 , 200 
57 , 895 . 
2 , 699 , 2 31 
25 , 347 
1 1 , 620 
34 , 50 0  
62 6 , 800 
N�14 . 
SUm.=7 , 733 , 445 
Mean=552 , 38 9 
752 , 800 
240 , 483 
2 6 , 000 
2 , 000 
1 85 , 850 
4 , 1 78 , 0 50 
2 , 7 14 , 861 
2 , 357 , 0 1 6  
2 , 7 14 , 861 
2 3 , 000 
563 , 200 
,2 54500 9 ,  00 
11�1 3 
Sum=l ) , 807 , 52 1  
Mean=l , 062 , 1 1 7 
Food Difference 
(metric · tons staple 
grains/capita ) 
. 1 1 69 




. 12 1 9  
. 1 32 1 
. 6924 




. • 0 966 
I . 201 1 
N=14 
suin=2 . 7 644 
Me�n= . 1 97 5· 
. ·. 
. 1 379 
. o 8jJ 
. 0066 
. OOJJ 
. 1 91 5  
. 072 9 
. 482 5 
· . 5270 
. 482 5 
. 0056 
. 1 848 
. 0 938 
. oo4J 
lli=lJ 
SUm=2 . 2 7 60 
Mean= . 1 7 50 
.(45 ) 
Trade Value Difference 
(mi ll ion u . s .IJ  
76 
2 14 
2 5 , 1 91 




. 2 5 9 2 80 
6 , 935 




2 , 2 77 
If=14 
Sum=1 32 1 62 1 Mean=9 , 47J 





8 , 2J4 
44 , 71 5 · 
3 3 , 949 
44 , 7 1 5  
6 1 6  
2 , 556 
2 1 , 004 854 . .  
N=1 2  
. Sum=165 , 698 
Mean=12 , 746 
DS I I I  
1Ka s hm i r  negot iat i o n s  
1Revo lut i onarie s i n  
Panama 
'Aze r Bai j an 
Ka s hm i r  Se ce s s i on 
,Bize rte 
,Aden Inde pend e nce 
,se cond Kas hm i r  War 
and Negot i a t i ons 
'Inte rvent i on in 
· Dom i n i c an · Re pub l i c  
DS IV 
Cypru s Civ i l  War 
Football War 
Se cond Co s ta B i c an 
Ex i l e s  
Kuwai t  Independence 
(Arab: Le a gue ) 
First Co s ta Ri c an 
1 950 
1 9 59 
1 946 
1 948 








1 961  
1 948 
Ex i le s  
Indone s i an Inde pendence ' 48 
Chine se i n  Burma 1 953 
Britl sh Came roons 1 959 · 
We st Irian 1 954 
Honduran Borde r 1 963 
Congo Inde pendence 1 95 9  
Togoland 1 958 
Thai land - Cambod i a  1 958 
Borde r · 





Ind i a-Paki s t an 
Panama�Cuba 
Iran-u . s . s . R .  
Ind ia -Paki stan 
Tun i s i a-France 
Aden-u . x .  
Ind ia-Paki stan 
U . S . -Dom in i c a n  
Republ ic 
SUm diff . = 1 , 3 1 7 , 7 1 5  
Cypru s -Turkey 
El Salvador-Honduras 
Co sta Ri ca-
N i caragua 
Kuwa i t -U . K .  
Co sta Rica-
N i caragua 
Indone s i a-Net he rland s 
Burma-Re p .  of C h i na 
U . K . - Came roon :, 
Indone s i a-Ne t he rland s 
Hondura s -Ni c a ragua 
Cong o -Be lg ium 
Tog o  land -France 
Tha i land -Cambod i a  
I s re al-Argent ina 
Spa in-Moro c c o  
Po:e . Differe nce 
( thou sand s ) 
272 , 960 
5575 
1 14 , 32 0  
2 68 , 7 9 9  
41 , 706 
53 , 587 
)80 , 1 24 
180 , 644 
Mean d i f f  . =1 64 , 7 14 
2 9 ; 667 
853 
2 80 
; ) �'.� , ,6t> := 
52 � 603 
346 
62 , 400 
1 7 , 0 1 1 
50 , 506 
69, 1 8 0  
483 
47 1 7  
4) , 484 
1 6 , 734 
17 , 892 
1 7 , 41 2  
X=1 5 Sum d i ff . =38J , 568 Me an d i f f  . =2 5 , 57 1  
aourc e s s Di spute s - Conf l i c t  Management � Inte rnat i onal Organ i za t i o ns ,  
. . pp . 12 - 1 3 . 
Di sputant� and Years- I s su e s Be fore !h!:!. A s s emb l i e s  .2f. � Y.:l!.!.t 
· 
vo l s . 1 -5 ,  and Eve ryman '  s !l..!l!.:.' 1 968 . . 
Populat i on data-U . N .  S t a t i s t i c a l  Ye a rbook , var iou s ye a r s . 
Area data-U . N . statis t i c a l  Ye a r b o ok , var i ou s  years , and 
The St a t e sman ' s  Ye a rbook , v a r i ou s  year s . 
G . D . P .  data -U . N . S t a t i s t i c a l  Ye arbook , var i ou s  ye ar s . 
Area Difference 
{sq .  m i le s ) 
896 , 348 
15 , 00 9 . 
8 , 0 1 3 , 204 
896 , 348 
3 , 133 ,. 050 
816 , 089 
896 , 348 
3 ,660 , 570 
R=8 
Sum=1 8 , 32 6 , 966 
Mean=2 , 290 ,  870 
29? , 81 0  
35 , 017  
J0 , 61 8  
810 , 061 
J0 , 61 8  
666 , 858 
24? , 905 
748 , 077 
666 , 858 
6191 6 
839 , 675 
4 , 308 , 52 3  
128 , 559 
1 , 064 , 081 
135 , 1 64 
1=1 .5  
SUm.=1 0 , 0 1 6 , 740 
Xean=667 , 78J .  
(4? ) 
G . D . P .  Di fference 
(m i l l i on u . s .  I )  




37 , 12 7  
?4 , ?42 
35 , 685 
527 , 802 
N=6 
Sum=70 3 , 33 9  
Mean=1 1 ? , 22 3  
6 , 688 
280 
7 
1 63 , 404 
56 
2 , 0 1 9  
576 
1 64 , 0 1 1  
4 , 386 
23 
1 0 , 5 94 
42 , 30 6 
1 , 603 
1 0 , 422 
1 3 , 375  
N=1 5  
Sum=41 9 , ? 50 
Mean=27 , 983 
't( . 
M1litarl Pe rsonne l  
(number 
186 , 000 
23 , 405 
* 
171 , 000 
l ', 0 1 2 , 00 0  
483 , 000 
740 , 000 
,.::. ' .; . � :J .  � - \ 1 .. 
2 , 380 , 141 
N=7 
Sum=5 , 005 , 546 
Mean=7 1 J , 650 
368 , 400 
850 
2 , 300 
577 , 700 
2 , 338 
4) 560 
424 , 352 
589 , 750 
32 , 000 
720 
57 , 50 0  
1 , 024 , 800 
41 , 0 00 
1 53 , 2 00  
22 5 , 000 
K=1 5 
Sum=3 , .543 , 470 
Mean=2 36 , 2 31  
Pe r s onne l data-The St a te sman ' s Yearbook , var i ou s  ye ars . 
Food dat a -U . N . S'tat i s t i c a l  Yea rbook , vari ou s year s . 
Trade data::u:N. Stat i s t i c a l  Ye arbook , var i ou s  ye ars . 
Food Di f fe rence 
(me tric tons staple 
grains/capita ) 
. 1 1 53 
. •  1585 
.2008  




. 61 92 
1=8 
. SU1ll=1 . 5530 
Mean= . 1 941 
. 2 663 
. 0 540 
. �474 
' I . •" 
' 1 ,, 
. 0494 
.01 98 
. 1 1 53 
• 041 6 
. 0562 
. 12 60 
. 0491 
. 0523 
. 2 1 67· 




SUm=l . 7064 
Mean= . 11J8 
(48 ) 
Trade Value Di fference 
(million u .• s .  $ )  
1 , 586 
1 , 377( 
1 , 7 1 3  
2 ,306 
. 1 3 , 567 
24 , 847 
3 ,.042 
3 5 , 245 
N=8 
Sum=83·,  683 
Mean=l0 , 460 
862 
67 
2 6  
2 0 , 836 
41 
2 . 037 
96 . 
1 9 , 92 1  
3 , 776 
33 
5 , 941 
1 0 , 693 
573 
1 , 62 1  
1 , 864 
N=1 5  
Sum=68 , J87 
Mean=4 , 559 
(49 ) 
Graph s s  
Pag e s  51 -56 graph i cally pre s e nt our raw data . Suc c e s s  
i s  plotted against D S  group me an s . In e a c h  ca se t he x-ax i s  i s  
our independ�nt var i able ---int e rnat i onal o rgani zat i on suc c e s s .  
As i nd i cated in t he methodol ogy sect i o n , succe s s  increase s a s you 
move t o  the right , f rom DS I to DS IV . The y -ax i s s cale s a 
dependent var i ab l e ---one o f  t he powe r variable s .  
Our hypot he s i s  pred i c t s  an i nv e r s e  re lat i on s h i p  be tween 
decre a s i ng powe r parity and internat i onal o rg an i z at i on succe s s .  
How d o  t he se graphs c ompare t o  the pre d i cted grap h ic re la t i onship? 
Are t h e re any re curring f e ature s i nd 1 cat i�g what m ight prope rly 
be concluded? 
Exam i nat i on reve a l s  t hree c on s i stenc ie s . Firat ,  none of t he 
grap h s  plot a l ine wi t h  a s iope o f  - 1 . The only one t o  roughly 
approac h thi s i s  graph 5 .  Second ly ,  i n  all but graph 5 t he me an s  
o f  D S  I I  and D S  I I I  are highe r  t han tho se o f  both D S  I and D S  IVe · 
Th i rdly , in all s i x  case s t he mean value s of DS IV are the · · smalle st 
value s .  
What d o  these obs e rvat i on s  i nd i cate ? A s  t o  our f i rs t  po int , 
a negat ive ly s l oped l ine would i nd i c ate tha� our hypo t he s i s i s  
true . That; �ndeed , par i t y  incre a s e s a s  suc ce s s  incre a s e s .  Bu� , 
thi s i s · not t he case . No c on s i stent patte rn appears .  
•' 
The mean value s o f  DS I I  ancr DS I I I  are , exc e pt in graph S ,  · 
the h i g he st value s .  Th i s  would i ndi cate that internat i onal 
o rgan i zat i o n s  are only s l ig htly ( DS I I ) or mode rately ( DS I I I )  
suc c e s s ful when relat ive ly greate r . d if f e re nc e s  in powe r exi st .  
That i s , when t �e re i s  a greate r non-equ ivale nce o f  power , 
inte rnat i o nal organ i za t i ons are o f  l i t t l e  o r  mode rate e f fe c t . 
( 50 ) 
The lowe s t  mean value f o r  e ac h var iable appe a r s  in DS IV. 
Th i s  would i nd i ca t e t hat in ca se s where interna t i onal o rgan i za­
t i on s  we re most succe s s ful , state powe r was al s o m o s t  equ ivale nt .  
















( 51 ) 
GROUP MEAN---POPULATION 
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D . S .  G roup 
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D . S .  Group 
C:R A 'PH 6 
( 57 )  
T-t e s t  analy s i s : 
T-te s t s  t e s t  the s igni f i cance o f .  d i f f e ren c e s be tween 
means . For t h i s  e f fort , t h i rt y - s ix t -t e s t s  we re pe rfo rmed t o  
te s t  s � gn i f i cance , at t he . 05 leve l , f or e ac h  DS group mean aga i n s tt 
eve ry o t h e r  DS group mean for e a c h  var iable . 
The re su l t s  ar� pre sented on page s  56- 60 .  Eac h c ompar i son 
inc lude s var i able name , numbe r of c a s e s i nvo lved , t he mean of e ac h  
. case , t value , p value ( probab i l i ty" value ) a nd a c o lumn concluding 
i f  t he difference : between:Jil.ean s  i s  s i gn i f i cant·. It s hould be 
ment i oned t ha t  tr v,alue :· t s · , tht H ptobab 1 1 1 ty ·· t hat · the · : ob s e rved 
d i f f erence be tween means was due to c hance . For a d i f f e rence t o  
b e  s igni f i cant , p value mu s t  be .05 o r  le s s .  
In 3 2  o f  J 6  case s ,  n o  s igni f i cant d i f feren02 e x i st s .  Th i s  
sugge s t s  two t h i ng s . Fi r s t , t he prevale nt t rend t oward s non­
s igni f i cant d i fference s sugge s t s  that d i f f ere nce s be tween mean s  
are due l arge ly to c hance . That i s ,  i f  one we re t o  randomly 
s e lect a group o f  s t a t e s ,  randomly a s s ign t hem t o  one of t he DS 
groups and t e s t  our hypot he s i s ,  one wou ld gett s im i lar re sult s .  
Se condly , t h o se grap h i c t rend s d i s cu s sed above are not s ig n if 1 i ·· 
cant . Sinc e  graph i c  d i fferenc e s  be tween me an s are not stat i st ically 
s ign i f i c ant , graph i c  trend s cannot re l i ably gu i de -..-;conc lu s t ons • 
. Before mov ing on to a conclu s i on on t he hypo t he s i s , c e rtain 
\ 
other mat t e r s  mu s t  be cons i d e red . In s e ct i on J . 2  be low ,  t he 
nature and use of stat i s t i cal t e c hnique s ,  and _ the t-te s t  i n  
part i cu lar ., i s  d i s c u s sed . An unders tand i ng of t h o s e  po i nt s made .. .:: ... 
i s  a ne ce s s ary pre cedent to form i ng conc lu s i ons o 
( 58 ) 
RESULTS OF T-TEST ANALYS I S  
- - �  
Com�ari s on o r  DS I mean s to DS II mean s : 
Signif icant 
Vari f!ble Case s Mean t value E value at . o� level 
Population I-14 34 , 938 1 . 02 0 . 3 1 9 no 
II-.1 3 61 , 02 9 
. .  
Area I.:..1 4 1 , 0 35 , 2 68 1 . 2 0  0 . 243 no 
II�1 J 1 , 2 38 , 484 
'G •P�P .  I-1 3  93 , 77 6  0 . 65 0 . 52 5 no 
II-9 .- 1 54 , 568 
Per s onne l 1.:.. 14 552 , 389 1 . 2 0  0 . 242 no 
II-13  1 , 062 , 1 1 7  
Food I-14 . 1 975 0 . 2 6  ·0 . 7 97 no 
II-13 . 1 750 
T .V � I-14 9 , 473 o . 68 0 . 503 no 
II-12 12 , 746 
Compari s on o r  DS . I means to DS I I I  means : 
Sign i f i cant 
Variable Ca s e s  !!!!!!. t value :e va lue at . o �  level 
Populat i on I-14 
III.;.8 
J4 , 938 
1 64 , 7 14 
3 . 1 5  0 . 005 ye s 
Area 1•14 1 , 035 , 268 1 . 42 0 . 172 no 
III�8 2 , 2 90 , 870  
G . D . P .  1�13 93 ; 776 0 . 2 5  0 . 80 6  no 
I II-6 1 1 7 , 22 3 
Pers onne l I-14 552 , 389 ' 0 . 38 0 . 70 8  no · 
II �-7 7 1 3 , 650 
Food I-14 . 1 975 0 . 03 0 . 974 no 
III-8 . 1 941 
T .V .' i•1 4 9 , 473 0 . 1 6 · 0 . 877  no 
I I I-8 1 0 , 460 
. ( 59 )  
Compari s on o f  DB I means to DB IV means : 
Bignif i cant 
Vari able Case s � t value :e ·value at . 0,2 leve l 
Populat ion I-14 . 34 , 938 0 . 55 0 . 586 no 
IV ·1 .5 2 5 , 57 1  
Area I-14 1 , 035 , 2 68 0 . 1 9 0 . 853 no 
IV-1 5 667 , 7 83 
G . D . P .  I-1 3 93 , 776 1 . 31 0 . 2 0 3  no 
IV'"-1 5  2 7 , 983 
Personne l I-14 552 , 389 1 . 1 6 0 . 2 55 no 
IV-1 5  2 36 , 2 3 1  
Food I-14 . 1 97 5  1 . 2 5  0 . 22 3  no 
IY -1 5 . 1 1 3 8 
t � / • ..! ,  . .. . 
T .V .  !•14 9 , 47 3 1 . 1 6 0 . 258 no 
I V-1 5 4 , 5.59 
Compari son of . DB I I  means to DS I I I  meaf¥; : 
B1gn1f i ca.nt 
Var i able Case s Means t value I? value at . o� leve l 
Populat i on II- 13 6 1 , 02 9  2 . 32 0 . 031 yes 
III-8 1 64 , 7 1 4  
Ar�E1 11.;;.1 3  1 , 2 38 , 484 0 . 52 0 . 612 no 
1I1.;.a 2 , .2 90 , 870 
G . D . P .  I I-9 1..54 , 568 0 . 30 0 . 769 no 
III-6 1 1 7 , 22 3  
Personnel II-13  1 , 062 , 1 1 7  o . 68 0 . 50 8  no 
I II-7 7 1 3 , 650 
Food II-1 3 . 1�0 0 . 22 0 . 82 5  no 
III-8 . 1  1 
T . V .  · II-1 2  12 , 746 . o . 46 0 . 653 no 
I II-8 1 0 , 460 
( 60 ) 
Compari s on of DS I I  means to DS IV means : 
Sign1 f i cant · 
Vari able Ca se s Mean t value ;e value at . 02 leve l 
Populat i on I I-13 6 1 , 02 9 1 . 79 0 . 085 no 
IV-1 5 . 2 5 , 57 1 
Area I I- 1 3  1 , 2 38 , 484 0 . 81 o . 427 no 
!11-1 5 667 , 783 
G . D . P .  II-9 1 54 , 568 . 1 . 87 0 . 07 5  no 
Iv.;.: 1 5  · 27 , 983 
Personne l I I-1 3 1 , 062 , 1 1 7  2 . 36 0 . 02 6  ye s 
IV-1 5 2 36 , 2 3 1  
Food I I-1 3 . 1 750 1 . 11 0 . 278 no 
IV-1 5 · . 1 1 38 
T .V . II-12  12 , 746 1 . 85 0 . 076 no 
IV-1 5  1 0 , 460 
compa r i son Of DS III mean s  to DS IV mean s : 
Sign i f i c ant 
v:ariable Ca se s Mean s  t value p value at . 0 5 level 
Populat i on I I I-8 1 64 , 7 14 4 . oo 0 . 00 1  ye s 
IV-1 5 2 5 , 57 1 .. 
Area I I I-8 2 , 2 90 , 870 1 . 07 0 . 2 98 no 
IV-1 5 667 ,9 783 
G . D . P .  II I-6 1 1 7 , 22.; 1 . 61 0 . 123  no 
IV-1 5 27j 983 
Per s onne l III-7 7 1 3 , 650 2 . 03 0 . 055 no 
IV-1 5 2 36 , 231 
Food III•8 . 1 941 1 . 42 0 . 170  no  
IV-1 5 . 1 1 3 8  
T . V . III-8 1 0 , 460 1 . 42 0 . 1 69 no 
IV-1 5 4 , 559 
( 61 )  
J . 2  Cauti ons 2!2 t he Use  o f  Sta t i st i c s  i n  Hypothe s i s  Te s t i ng 
Any s tudy employ i ng met hodolog i cal  t e c hnique s s hould 
nece s sari ly inc lude a statement of caut i on in t he u se of t hat 
approac h .  The logi cal po i nt o f  departure for suc h  an ingu i ry 
i s  t he very nature of s c i ence , for wi t h i n  t hat nature l i e s  an 
e xplanat i on f o r  i t s  u se . 
One t h i ng wh i c h  set s man apart f rom oth:e.�' . r , ! ! '  anima l s  i s  
h i s  abi l i ty to  engage in ab stract t h i nk i ng .  For e xample , man 
can con s i de r  a numbe r o f  d i ve r s e  i tems and abstrac t certa i n  
c haracter i s t i c s  t hey have i n  c ommon . He can survey a group o f  
i tems ,  and abstract  sali ent c haracteri s t i c s  repre sent ing t he i r 
re lat i on s h i p . 
Howeve r ,  abs t ract i on can be carri ed too  far . Unthink i ng ,  
overzealou s  at tempt s at quan t i f i cati on c an make g i bberi s h  o f  
a subj e c t . Caut i o� mu s t  be exerc i sed s o  t hat gue s s i ng and s pe c ­
ulat i on a r e  n o t  e levated to a level o f  re spect f a r  exceed i ng 
t he i r  t rue worth . The mot ive force s be h i nd t he u s e  o f  quant t i -
tative te c hn ique s are admirable . Prac t i oner s  s e ek exactne s s · 
and pre c i s i on i n  s eeking re levant summary data informat i on and 
. 75 in evaluating non-random data P'ifterns . But t he se mo t ive s mus t  
be tempered b y  real i t i e s ,  and be d i re c t ed t oward t he end o f  
re flect ing rea l i ty . We may fancy ours e lve s cybe rne t i c soph­
i st i cate s , but we mus t  remi nd ourselve s o f  t he obfuscat i ng 
l imitat i on s  o f  t he computat i o na l  art s . 
75 .. 
Dav i d  S i l l s ,  ed . ,  Interna t i onal Encycloped i a  o f  the So c i a l  
Sc i ence s , p .  209 . 
( 62 ) 
Becau se of t h i s ,  i t  i s  de s i r�able t o  employ and adhere to  
t he general approach to solv i ng problems called " t he s c i e nt i f i c  
method . "  Thi s "me t hod " i s  a s e r i al pro ce s s  by whi c h all o f  t he 
s c i ence s  obtain answe r s  to t he i r  quest i ons . It  need not be 
expli c i t ly used , but se lect ive ly u se d . Here , one can employ 
a s c i ent i f i c  approach effect ively be cau s e  pol i t i cal s c i enc e  doe s 
not con s ider unso lvable problems . Po l i t i cal  s c i ence i s  not a 
me taphy s i c al d i sc i pl i ne . I t con s iders rea l problems whi c h  have 
real answers . Po l i t i cal  s c i e nt i st s  have t he capac i ty ( though 
not a s  yet all the nece s sary - means ) to s o lve t he problems whi c h  
confront t hem . They examine t he be hav i o r  o f  state s and i nd ividual s , 
re lat i on s h i p s  and i nterac t i o n s , whi l e  avo i d i ng suc h  que s t i on s  
a s  tho s e  po sed by c la s s i ca l  p h i lo sophers ( ex : What cau sed t he 
universe ? ) . A true s c i e nt i s t  l im i t s  h i s work to t he solvable . 
He stay s  away from t he supe rnatural . To be have a s  a s c i e nt i st 
i s  to employ sequent i a l  pro ce s se s  in t he study o f  s olvable problems . 
I s  t h i s exerc i se s c i e nt i f i c ?  Let u s  e xami ne t he cri t e r i a  
o f  the s c i e nt i f i c . First , doe s i t  beg i n  wi t h  a real problem? 
The answe r i s  ye s .  The examinat i on o f  t he peacekeeping effort s  
o f  internat i onal o rgani zat i on s  i s  truly a problem . We l ive i n  
a world marked by confl i ct .  Conf l i c t  re s o lu ti on ,  l ikewi se , 
ia a da i ly exe rc i se .  The wo rk i ng o f  suc h endeav o r s  i s  rea l .  
I t  i s  thi s aut ho r ' s be l i e f  t hat our hypot he s i s  repre sent s 
a solvable problem . I t  scru t i n i ze s  an experi enced s i tua t i on 
wh i c h  i s  po tent i a l ly s o lvabl e . Thu s , t he second c r i ter i a , 
potent i al so lvabi l i ty ,  i s  met .  We can obse rve t he que s t  f o r  
confl i ct re s o lut i on .  We c an re cord i t s  met hod s ,  i nterv i ew i t s  
( 6J )  
pra c t i one r s  and ana lyze i t s  c onsequenc e s .  
Bui ld i ng upon t hi s ,  we move to  t he more concrete a spe c t s  
o f  our me t hodology . The exper i menter mus t  expre s s  a tentat ive 
s o lu t i o n  to the problem . The tentat ive s o lu t i on c a l led a 
hypot he s i s  i s  a rea s o ned potent ial  s olut i o n ,  or merely a vague 
gue s s . After thi s ,  the expe r i menter seeks to determine whe t he r 
t he hypo t he s i s  i s  true o r  false ( o r  probably s o ) . Doe s  i t  s olve 
t he problem he has po sed for h imse l f ?  
Then , data mu s t  b e  co llec ted . A group o f  wo rkable s ub j ects  
i s  selected . The nature of t he problem wi l l  determi ne t he sub j e ct s , 
and random i z at i on i s  a mus t . Groups c a nnot be sele cted , s tud ied 
and experime nted upon unle s s  t he i r  selec t i o n  re s u l t s  from s ome 
equivalent proce s s . 
Given t he rigor o f  such a proce s s , one may move from 
empiri cal observat i on to i nf erenc e s  and conc lu s i o n s ( however 
qua l i f i ed or l imited ) . Inf e re nce may l e ad t o  the conf i rmat i on 
or deni a l  o f  t he hypot h� s is ,  a c lue a s  t o  t he next appro p i ate 
experiment , a narrow i ng o f  t he range of po s s i b le a l ternat ive s , 
o r  to  t he conclu s i Qn tha t  t he observat i on i s  wort hle s s . 
Thi s  s hould be f o l lowed by a statement i nd i c at i ng t he degree 
of c e rta i nty wit h  wh i c h  the i nference i s  made . I nferenc e s  may be 
c l early true , or c learly false . Conc l u s i on s  may be tentat ive ly 
true , or tentat ively false . Or they may be pre sently so lvable , 
or potent i a l ly te s t able a nd s o lvable . Eac h  alternat ive i s  o f  
equal va lue and a s i gni f i cant c o nt ri bu t i on to  t h e  ac cumulated 
kn�wledge o f  a d i s c i pl ine .  A re searc he r s ho u ld not be pre j ud i ced · 
i n  favor o f  a ny ove r t he othe r � . He mu s t  ad here t o  t he laws o f  
( 64 )  
par s imony . 
It i s  important t o  re�embe r t ha t  whatever mod e  o f  a na ly s i s  
i s  employed , t he i nf erence t o  whi c h  a stat i st i cal met hod d i re c t ly 
76 
re late s  i s  l imited t o  t he populat i o n  a ctually expe rimented upon . 
One can s e ek to widen t he b re a d t h  o f  i n f e renc e , but a l im i t must  
be  rea c he d . For example , we  here mu s t  observe t emporal l im i tat i ons , 
. a s  data c a nnot be c o l le cted on' future , unknown i nternat i o nal 
event s . Thu s , inference i s  a two� step proce s s  involving , 1)  d i re ct 
inference t o  t he sampled populat ion , and 2 )  i nd i re ct i nfe rence . 
from t he sample to a wi der realm . 
Our hypot he s i s i s  j u st i f i ed becau s e  i t  que s t i ons  a statement 
stated as a fac t , but in actua l i ty i s  not supported by observed 
real i t i e s .  I t  i s  an unexpla i ned b i t  o f  i nformat i on o f fe rred up 
to tho s e  who read t he works of Young and Li ska . I t  repre sent s 
a ga g i n  our knowledge , a n  absence o f  ver i f i ed i nf o �mat i on .  I t  
i s  potent i al ly so lvable , courte sy o f  s c i ent i f i c  r i go r . Th i s  
t e s t ing pro ce s s  ha s been gu i de d  by t he rule s o f  s c i e nt i f i c  
inve s t i gat i on .  
In add i t i on t o  t he above d i scus s i on ,  t h i s aut hor wi s he § to 
include a note concerni ng t he use o f  t e s t s  of  s i gn i f i cance in 
behav iora l  res earc h .  The i r  u s e  mu s t  be mea n i ngfu l  and wi t h i n  
t he proper experimenta l  context . Furt h e r , t he i r  u se mu s t  no t  be 
i nd i s criminate , and i nfere nc e  f rom t he i r  result s  mus t  be tempered 
by cert a i n  cons ide rat i ons . 
76 
Ibid . , P •  212 . 
( 65 )  
T-te s t s  have been the c e nter o f  s ome controve rsy . Ce rtain 
analysts ·::would have u s  l imit t he i r  u s e  t o  stri c t ly experimental 
77 
set t i ngs . Other s e ncoura ge i t s  u s e  i n  non-expe rime ntal set-
t i ngs a s  wel l , but would i s s ue t he se two caut i ons . F i r s t , care 
must be exerc i sed i n  t he i nte rpretat i on of t e s t  re sul t s . Te s t s  
o f  s i gn i f i cance y i e ld state�ent s of  probab i l ity . They do  no t 
aff o rd any i n s i ght i nto  t he c a u s e  o f  a n  observed relat i o n s h i p .  
Suc h  t e s t s  tell  u s  i f  t he data i s  wo rt h i nterpret ive attent i on ,  
7 8 and 1'f a <· · real · d i fference between·  groups ·  exi st s .; . . ,  Seco ndly , · one 
mu s t  not equate s ta t i s t i c a l  s i gn i f i cance wi t h  sub s �ant ive 
. 79 s i gn i f i cance . 0 : They are no t t he same , a nd mu s t  not be c o nfu sed . 
As a la s t  po i nt , let  u s  c o n s ider , aga i n ,  t he problem o f  
inferenc e . There a re a number o f  problems i nvo lved in  i nferring 
from t he part t o  t he whole . I n  t he s o c i a l -be hav i o ral realm , 
t rue expe rimenta'b. on i s  made d i f f i cult by a lack o f  experimenter 
control over a large number o f  extraneou s var i able s .  Pot e nt ial  
i nfluence s  must  be taken into  cons i derat i on ,  and genera l i z at i ons 
mus t  be made with  a degree o f  tentat ivene s s . 
Th i s  experiment owe s i t s  parti cular form t o  t he pro ce s se s  
o f  quant i f i cat i on and stat i s t i c a l  analy s i s .  The above caut i ons 
77Hans c .  Se lv i n , " A  Cri t ique o f  Te s t s  o f  S i gn i f i cance in 
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Survey Re search , "  Ameri can So c i ological  Rev iew , p . 520 . 
Robert F .  Winch , "Pro o f ? No . Evi d ence ? Ye s .  The S i gn i f i cance 
o f  Te st s of S i gni f i c ance , "  The Ame r i c a n  So c i ologi s t , 
p . 140 . . . � 
Donald Gold , " Stat i s t i ca l  Te st s a nd Subs t ant ive S i gn i f i cance , "  
The Ame r i c a n  Soc i o logi s t , p .  44 . 
( 66 .> 
have been ne ce s sari ly heeded . I n  se ek i ng systema t i zed knowledge , 
we mu s t  be ever aware of t he l imitat i o n s  o f  pre sent technique s .  
Then , and o nly then , can we a s  soc i a l  s c i e nt i st s  sub stant i a l ly 
increa se our knowledge , a nd ad vance t he po s i t i on o f  our j udg.,. .. -
ment s .  
CHAPTER 4 
C'onc lu s i on and Spe cu lat i ons 
A s  t he above d i s cu s s i on make s c le ar , t he re are two leve l s  
o f inte rence . In t h i s c haptfe r , bo t h  w i l l  be c on s idered , butr­
apart from one ano t h e r . Di re c t  infere nc e s are c onc lu s ions 
hav ing to do only with t he sampled· popu la t i on .  Conc lus ions 
are l imi ted , as they mu s t  be , if s c i ent i f i c  rigor i s  t o  be main­
tained . Ind i re c t  i nf e rence s are specula� i ons . He re , one 
at tempt s t o  widen t he po s s i ble u t i l i t i e s  and appl i cat i on s  o f  
the drawn c onc lus ion. 
4 . 1  Conc lu s i on 
As no ted in s e c t i on 3 . 1 ,  t he re i s  a d e f i n i t e  pat t e rn of 
non-s igni f i cance of d if fe rence s between group means . Due t o  t h i s ,  
t h i s aut h o r  mu s t  c onc lude thatL our hypot he s i s  i s  f al s e . Differ­
ence s i n  powe r  o f  · p art ie s  to two -party d i s pute s appe ars not t o  
affe ct inte rnat i onal o rgani zat i on su c c e s s .  Powe r d i f fe renc e s d o  
n o t  affe c t  t he wo rk i ng s  o f  internat i onal o rgani zat i on s  in the i r  
que st to maintain world o rde r  and promote human we l fare . 
4 , 2  Spe cu lat i on s  
Specu lat ion s are re a s oned ext en s i ons o f  t he c onc lu s i on. 
They are of. · . 11m1ted val id i ty and inv o lve cons ide rable · r i sk .  
Howeve r ,  only through spe cu l a t i on c an one hope t o  pro f i t  f rom 
any i nve s t igat i on . 
Imp l i c a t i o n s : 
Fi rst , l e t  u s  c on s i d e r · c e r t a i n  impl i cat i on s  that t h i s  
( 68 )  
s tudy may have i n  regard t o  f our o t h e r  wo rk s . In Conf l i c t  
Management !.!!9:, Int e rnat i onal Organ i zat i ons , Haas e t  al . , t ouch 
upon the re l at i on s h i p  of powe r of t he p art i e s  to a d i s pute and 
degree of succe s s . The i r  approach i s  s omewhat d 1 f fe ren� from 
t hat o f  t h i s s tudy . They plot , in tabular f o rm , succe s s (none 9 , 
s ome , moderate or great ) aga i n s t  powe r rank i ng s  of antagon i s t s  
( smal l e s t  v s . smalle s t , m i ddle v s .  sma l l , supe r power v s . m i dd l e  
powe r ,  e t c . ) . 'Nl e y  c onc lude t hat suc ce s s  increas e s  a s  t h e  powe r 
of t he antagon i st s  decrea s e s .  That i s ,  the o rgan i z at i on s  are 
�o st suc c e s s ful in deal i ng w i t h  we ak part i e s�O 
They ind i cate t hat power can be i n t e rpre ted a s  an importantt 
fac t o r  i n  dete rm i n i ng the suc c e s s  o f  internat i onal organi zat i on s . 
Furt he r s c rut i ny i nd i cate s that a s  t he d i f f e rence of powe r 
be tween pa i r s  of  antagon i s t s  de c re a s e s ,  internat i onal o rgani z a ­
t i on suc ce s s  increa se s .  Th i s  c o rre spond s : :wi t h  our hyp o t h e s i s . 
However ,  t h i s mo�e inc i s ive and c omp lex cons i d e rat i on of t h i s  
relat i on s h i p  i nd i cate s t hat succ e s s  i s  not depe ndent upo n powe r 
par i ty .  
Thu s , i t  mu s t  be due t p  s ome o t h e r  factor. Three p o s s i ble 
i nf luenc e s  come t o  m i nd •  
( 1 ) Situat i on s  may have been a f f e cted by how an antagoni st 
v i ews t he s i tuat i on .  I s  i t  important? Can i t  gain , or can it 
only l o s e ?  
(2 ) I s  su c c e s s  d u e  t o  t he f a c t  t hat  one part i cular i s sue 
'r4.C.IA <' r &"I"<\'\� 
i sY brought bef o re i nt e rnat i onal o rgan i zat i ons, and t he o rgan i zat i o n s  
' 80 c Haa s  et al . , p .  24.  
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happen to be succe s sful at i t ?  For example , case s brought before 
t he U .N .  of ten i nvo lve d e c o l on i zat i on .  An examina t i on o f  the . 
. Baas � study case s reveals that the U . N .  i s  mos t suc ce s sful at 
wo rk i ng wi th t hat i s sue . Pe rhaps an inord i nate number of suc h 
ca s e s c on s idered in t he unive r s e  of a s tudy would sugge s t  
internat i onal o rgan i z a t i on suc c e s s  over-al l ,  whi le a c lo s e r  look 
wou ld s h ow a c lu s t e ring of suc ce s se s  around one i s sue . 
(3 ) Perhaps patterns o f  succe s s  would be affec ted by t h i s : 
an organi zat i on may be v i r tually contro lled by a s tate i nvo lved 
in many c onf l i ct s  brought before the o rgan i zat i o n •  Thu s ,  t hat 
party c ou ld manuever the organi zat i o n  into a c t i ng in i t s ' 
i 
intere st s .  Conf l i c t s  would be qui ckly de c_ided i n  favor o f  t hat 
party . Many have claimed t h i s t o  be t he re l a t i ons h i p  of t he 
O . A . s .  and t he Un i ted State s .  Othe r s  have ob s e rved that Egypt 
has attempted a s im ilar man i pulat i on of member s  of t he Arab 
League , but has f a i red po�rly . 
Oran Young f e e l s  t hat t he U . N .  can take measure s  t o  
fac i l i tate t h e  non-yi o lent terminat i on o f  d i s pute s between the 
Sov i e t  Uni on and t he Uni ted Stat e s . He i ndi cate s that the U . N .  
need not conf ine i t s  ac t i vi tie s_ t o  prevent ive d i plomacy and 
e f f ort s t o  re s t r i c t  t he spread i ng o f  t he Cold War e On the 
c ontrary , there are a number of ro l e s  the U . N .  might play in t he 
event of such a seriou s d i spute�1 
81 toung , c h s . s-a . 
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_ Young further cr i t i c i ze s  t h o se who would sugge st the U . N .  
could play no role i n  a s e r i ou s  s i tua t i on becau se ne i t her the 
Sov i e t  Uni on or t he Uni ted Stat e s  wou ld accept t h i rd party 
82 i ntervent i on .  Th i s  problem o f  acceptab i l i ty i s based upon t he 
idea t hat t he se two · �tate s are s o  ve ry powerful re lat ive to 
other s tate s • . The i r  h i g h ·' . leve l of m i l i tary streng t h  would 
pre c lude any c hance of U .N .  suc c e s s  at med i at ion• 
Th i s  s tudy sugge s t s  t hat po�e r' d if f erence-s in two -pa rty 
d i s pute s have no e ffe ct upon i nte rnat ional organizat ion succe s s ,  
and t hat t h i s funct i on s  wi thouf regard t o  leve l of powe r .  
Tht?ref o re , t he fact t hat a u . s . -u . s . s . R .  cri s i s  would b e  one o f  
I 
a more . seve re - level would not have ; t he eff e c t  o f  pre c lud i ng 
ne i ther U . N .  succ e s s  or fa i lure . The abs o lute d i f fe rence in t he 
. measure s of t he i r  powers , regard le s s  o f  leve l  of power , would not 
. .  , 
affec t  o rgan i z at i onal effect ivene s s .  
In1 s · L .  Claude ' s  Power !.lli!, Inte rnat i onal Re 11t i ons i s  an 
analysi s  of t he theore t i cal approache s t o  t he pr�blem of the 
manageme n.t of state power---balance of powe r ,  c o l  lee t i  ve se curity , 
and world g overnment . Claude argue s t hat the latter two s ha re 
t he v irtue of re cogn i z i ng the requi rement f o r  s ome degree of -
8 central i zed management of powe r . 3 
. .  
He i ns i s t s  that theori s t s  o f  collect ive s e curity and world 
8
3 Ini s  L .  Claude , Power .!!!!!, Int e rnat iona l . Re l at i on s , P• 274 .  
82 . - Young , P •  1 73 . 
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government are c o rre c t  in t he i r  be l i e f  that our world requ i re s  a 
measur,l>f central d i re c t i on and and an agency capable of maintain­
i ng o rd e r ly relat i on s hips among t he c omponent . part s o f  t he 
syste)Jl�4 
Th i s  s tudy would i nd i c ate t hat i f  suc h an agency evo lve s ,  
out o f  the U . N .  sys tem o r  some o t h e r  o rgan i z a t i on ,  t he na ture 
of t Qe func t ions of t ha t  organ i z at i on wi l l  be c omplex. Intu i t ive 
i nd i cat ors of the problem s  of management of powe r wi ll not bear 
out . The me c han i c s of power managemen� wi l l  be intri cate . 
Th�or1 s t s  and pra.c t i oners' s hould heed:· t he �'= ev1dence . .  of thi s "and . 
s imi lar . s tud ie s .  
Stephen s .  Goodspeed fee l s  t hat the t a sk o f  internat i onal 
o rgan i zat i on i s  two-fold . Inte rna t i onal o rgani zat i o n s  seek t o  
furt her pol i t i cal and nat i onal s e curi ty , · as we ll a s  promo te 
e c onom i c  we lfare . To peacefu lly s e t t le d i spute s , o rgan i z at i ons 
mu s t  succ e s s fu l ly deve lop t he nec e s sary me an s . Th i s s tudy 
sugge � t s  that the nature of tho se means i s  ve ry c omplex . The i r  
nature i s  one o f  many and va� i e d  aspect s .  He re , we have h� lped 
c larify one. of t ho s e  bas i c  variable s i nvolved in internat i onal 
o rgan i zat i on intervent i on in conf l i c t  s i tua t i on s . 
Po s s i ble i nf luenc ing f a c tors : 
What factors may have influenced t he out c ome of thi s 
study? One po s s i b i l i ty i s  that organi z a t i onal suc c e s s  i n  ca s e s  
i nvolv i ng powe rful state s i s  affected by� a paradox in t he 
84 
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re la t i onship  o f  wea lth and nat i onal powe r .  That i s , s tate s of 
wea l t h  and power do not nec e s sar i ly exerc i se so le control in 
shaping t he i r  de s t iny .  Often , t he g reater one s wealth , t he 
gre a te r  t� de pendence upon othe r  state s .  The i nab i l i ty of gre a t  
powe r s  to accept the i dea that t he i r  wealth depend s , a t  least i n  
part , upon dev� lopi ng c ountr i e s may cause t hem t o  wi thdraw 
from e f f e c t ive mediat i on wi th them .  Inte rna t i onal o rgan i zati on s  
may n o t  po s s e s s  the means ne ce s sary t o  he lp a great power 
deal w i t h  the i rony of t h i s re lat i onship . 
When t here i s  a large power-sma l l  power confrontat i on ,  and 
t hus a l arge d i spa r i ty o f  powe r ,  there are two po s s ible factors 
i nf luenc i ng the outcome of t he d i spute . F i r s t , t he we ak ,  le s s  
wea l t hy state wi l l  have more to ga in f rom the d i spute , an� .thus , 
may act a s  a seve r9't d i srupt ive force . It has l i t t le , , i f  any­
t hing ,  to gain by accept i ng a solu t i o n  whi c h  1 s  part of t he 
s tatu s guo . 
Or , t he powerful powe r wi ll have s o  muc h  leverage ove r the 
weak party t hat it mu st accept the great  powe rs s o luti on, or a 
solu t i o n  propo sed by an internat i onal organ i z a t i on favor ing the 
more powe rful party . The weak may re lent t6 save face . 
When powe r d i fference s are small ,  interna t i onal organ i zat ion 
succe s s  may be minimal bec au se ne i ther party fears the o t he r . 
Entry into a conf l i c t  hold s the po s s ib i l ity that one s  adversary 
might gain an advantage , o r  expo se one s weakne s se s .  Qu i ck 
comprom i se and wi thdrawal f rom the c o nf l i ct may obscure t he true 
me a sure of organi z a t i on suc ce s s . In a ny case , o rgani zat i ons may · 
fac i l i tate conf l i ct abatemen� , but i t  may be i n  such a . way a s  to  
conceal the mo re imp o rt a nt i nf lu en c i ng f or c e s . 
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Sugge sted mod 1 f 1 cat i on s  for further c on s i de rat i on :  
How would t h i s author mod ify and complete t h i s study 
i f  he had unl imite9� ime and unl imi ted re source s at h i s  d i spo sal? 
There are a numbe r of po s s i b i l i t ie s .  
( 1 ) A be t te r  stat i st i cal t e s t , ye t unknown , cou ld be used . 
One m i ght incl.ude an analy s i s  of var i al1.ce t e s t  to c heck if 
wi th-in group var i ance s caused any between-group d i f f erence s . 
(2 ) One could wo rk wi t h  p s y c hophy s i cal tec hnique s ,  o r  
regre s s i on analy s i s  i n  t he hope o f  d i s c ove r i ng t hat t he i r  use , 
in a mod i f i ed f orm ,  wou ld allow t he c ompi lat i on of an acc eptable 
nat i onal powe r rank i ng . The Cox t e c hnique m ig ht have been used 
here to fulf i l l  t h i s  purp o s e . It would have made t h i ng s  eas ier , 
and neater . However ,  a s  stated be fore , the Cox t e c hnique i s 
inadequate and i s  not suf'.f-1 c i ently re l iable .  Th i s  aut hor f e e l s  
that val i d i ty cannot be sacrif i ced f o r  the sake of expe d iency . 
(3 ) G ive n t he proper t e c hnique s f o r  do ing suc h ,  d i spute s 
involv i ng more t han two s tat e s  could be cons idered • 
(4 ) one could expand t h i s study t o  include a who le serie s of . 
hypo t he se s i n  the hope that thi s wou ld pai nt a more c omple te , 
le s s  tentat ive p i c ture . 
( 5 )  A�tempt , through yet unknown means , to e l iminate 
extraneous vari able s influenc ing t h i s effort , so  that t he 
re lat ionship of the factors in t he hypothe s i s  can better be 
determined . Thi s  wou ld move u s  toward a more pure experimental 
s e+.t ing .  
( 6 ) Th i s  study could be orga n i zed i nt o  sec t i on s  con s id e r i ng 
t he United Nat i ons and t h e  vari ou s  reg i o nal organi za t i ons apart 
from one ano t her• 
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(7 ) A c ontent analy s i s  s tudy would be helpful 1n 
determln1ng tho se factors whi c h  make a state powerful . .  Stat e s  
perc• t:ved as powerful c ould b e  te s t ed a s  to  exi sting powe r ,  and 
the po s s e s s ion of  power factors . 
( 8 )  The numbe r  of power factor s  employed could be increased . 
( 9 ) The unive rse of cases  cons idered c ould be expanded . 
( 1 0 ) Complete and a c cu rate data would be s ought , ·  perhaps 
�ire c t ly from government publ icat i o n s .  
{ 1 1 ) One could u se s ome yet unknown tec hn ique to determine 
the cau se of observed relat i on s hips . 
( 12 ) Lastly , corre la t i on coeff i c ient s :determ1n1ng the 
I 
concurrence o f  powe r factors could be determined . The 1 r  u se 
would enhance ·- t he regular! ty of t he data and t he p art i cular mix 
of power factors . 
on'6 
Man" h1 s ·  nature : 
Thi s  bri ngs  u s  to one la st c onsidera t i on .  Th e exami­
nat ion of powe r  a s  an i nstrument of i nternat i ona l po l i t i cal 
interact ion bri ng s  .to mind an important phi lo sophi cal que s t i on : 
I s  violent!· human inte rac t i on ,  the re sult of a psycho-bi olog ical 
need , or i s  it a product of env i ronmental factors ? Since the 
Treaty of A�ras ( 1482 ) man has .  suffe�ed more than 280 ma j or wars�5 
I s  thi s the re sult o f  an inborn biologi cal trait , or i s  1t a 
learned behavi or? 
The se  que s t i o n s  e l i c it two d iffe r i ng re sponse s .  Some say 
t hat vi olence 1 s  the natural cond i t i on of man .  Ot he rs conte nd t hat 
80Mort 1mer Lipsky , Never Again !!!,t., p .  2 1 � 
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i t  i s  po s s i ble for man to l ive i n  peace . 
Tho se o f  the f o rmer v i ew i nc lude t he i nf luent i a l  seventeenth 
century ph i-lo sopher ,  Thoma s Hobbe s .  In h i s  monumental work , 
Lev i at han , Hobbe s s tate s t hat ment a re by · natur e r .equal . Thi s  
�qual i ty ie ad s · to an i ntense ly c ompe t i t ive atmo spheae i n  whi c h t here 
i s  " alway s war ·  of everyone aga i n s �· everyone . "  
86 
A more re cent exponent of t h i s pe s s imi s t i c  v i ew o f  the 
relat ionship  o f  human na ture to war is Hans J .  Morganthau . 
Morganthau i s  c onv i nced t hat " t he s t ruggle f o r  power i s  unive rsal 
in t ime a nd s pa ce and i s  an unden i able fact of experi ence " because 
".the drive t o  d ominate i s  c ommon t o  all men . •87 
Among those oppo s ing t h i s not i o n  o f  a f i xed human nature 
are a number o f  cultural anthropolog i s t s  inc lud i ng Margaret Mead . 
Mi s s  Mead c ha racteri ze s warfare a s  a "bad invent i on . " 88 It i s  
not a n  inev& tabi l i ty ,  f o r  evidence e x i s t s  t o  s how t hat wa s ha s 
not exi s ted at all time s  in  all s o c i e t i e s . For years , we have 
been aware of the Eskimo example . ·_More recent ly , the d i scovery o f  
t he Tasaday tribe of the Phi l i p�i ne s , has highlighted t h i s  idea . 
Eas i ly t he most . pr imi t ive t ribe _on Earth , t hey have no word for 
war , nor do t he y  have . an understand i ng of i t  a s  a concept�9 l. . . 
8�Thomas Hobbe s ,  Leviathan , p .  82 .  
87 . 
Morganthau , p. _ 88 . 
8 8  
Margaret Mead , �Warfare i s  o n l y  an Invent i on ,  Not a 
Biolog i cal Nec e s s i ty , " A s i a , Augus t  1 940 , P• 402 . 
8 9
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Th i s  author i s  of  . t he la tter v i ew .  Envi ro nment doe s 
ser i ou s ly affect  our c ompet i t ive and warring behav i o r s . Stud ie s 
suc h  a s  t h i s . allow u s  t o  t ake t hat f i rst , a l l - important step 
t oward a compre hens ive understand i ng of nat i onal power a nd 
c onf l i c t , a s  well a s  the dom inant and benign aspec t s  of powe r .  
4 . 3  Clo s ing 
It i s  wort h  repeat ing t hat a primary goal of t h i s  study was 
to he lp u s  move toward a more s y stemat i c  s tudy 'Of internat i onal 
po l i t ic s .  In do ing so , many o f  the advantage s and pitfal l s  o f  
t h i s searc h we re revealed . Theory i s  o ften unstructured , but 
i t  c�n succ e s s fu l ly guide re searc h .  Power , · a s an approach t o  
t he s tudy o f  internat i onal po l i t i c s , i s  complex . The re sults of 
any s tudy are sugge st ive , rather t han conclu s ive . The problems 
and qual i f i ca t i on s  seem end le s s , but t he search is worth all 
t he t ime , and a ll t he ene rgy requ i red to succeed . 
' I  
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POSTSC RIPT 
Though t h i s stud y i s  narrow i n  s c ope , i t  i s  a u seful and 
good  exerc i se f or man l ive s i n  an  e ra known a s  t he Atomi c  Age . 
He i s  often fi l led wi t h  f ear , a nd a longi ng f o r  a great e r  under­
stand ing of  h i s hope s and i na d equa c i e s . He  fears  i rrat i o nal 
d e at h ,  and wo nders  a bout t he i nev i tabi l i ty ,  o f  h i s own ult imate 
s e l f -de stru c t i on .  
The u l t i mate que s t i on begs answeri ng---Can man summon up 
t he wi l l  to c o ntrol h i s own anre s s i on s  i n  an age c haracteri zed 
by advanced de struc t i ove s c i enceJ Thi �  q ue st i on launc he s u s  o n  
t he long and arduou s j ourney o f  s e l f -scrut i n i zat i on and s ou l ­
s earc h ing .  I t  cal l s  f o r  man t o  �obi l i ze h i s s c i e nt i f i c  and 
i n t e l le ctua l energi e s  s o  t hat he may c ontro l h i s own d e s t i ny , 
and no l o nger serve a s  h i s own grea t e s t  enemy . 
Man mu s t  fa.-::'ce  t he real i t i e s  o f  h i s t i me , and a c t  upon t he 
ad j u s tment s t h o se real i t i e s  requ i re . I f  i t  call s for a rad i cal 
t ransformat i on o f  h i s  patterns o f  be hav i o r  and t h i nk i ng ,  so  be 
it. In an age where ma s s  d e st ruc t i on i s  only a pus h-button away , 
he mus t  break away from t ime wo rn expre s s i o ns  of h i s nature . 
Se l f - s crut iny i s  a ne ce s s i ty ,  a nd he mus t  welcome po s i t ive c hange 
in himse lf . He has l i t t le c ho i ce- but to  a t tempt t o  do a.way wi t h  
h i s mora l datedne ss .  Huma n wi s d om and i nt e l l e c t  mus t  evo lve 
t o  a leve l at leas t  equ a l  to t ha t  of technology .  The struggle 
between s c i ence and mora l i ty mu s t  be won by moral i ty .  O nly 
t he n  can ma n ' s incongru i t i e s  be l i fted t o  h i s  cons c i ousne s s  a nd 
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acknowledged . He mu s t  span t he gap betwe en h i s d e s t rUtt ive 
capabi l i t i e s  and hi s  w i l l  to  have a mea n i ngful exi s tence . 
Thi s  paper has dea l t  wi t h  Internat i o na l  Organ i zat i ons and 
o ne d imens i on of t he i r  peace -keepi ng e f f o rt s .  It i s  t he hope 
of ma ny t ha t  the se regi o na l  and wo r ld bod i e s  wi l l , t h rough t he i r  
e f f o rt s , prov i d e  man wi th  ample t ime and me ans  t o  span t he gap . 
Bu i ld i ng bri d ge s  i s  ne c e s sary , bu t s o  i s  the  study o f  t ho se  
me c hani sms wh i c h  deter de struc t i on in  the  hope t hat man i s  
capable of mee t ing t he c ha l le nge s o f  hi s own exi s tence � 
( 79 )  
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